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Abstract 
Although the law has traditionally treated non-human animals as property, public 
attitudes and many of our current laws already are beginning reflect many ways in which 
animals, and especially companion animals, are fundamentally different from inanimate 
property.  Despite these trends, the differences between animals and inanimate property need to 
be more clearly reflected in our laws, because there are still too many cases where the results 
under current laws are inconsistent with this understanding of companion animals.   
This article proposes the legislative creation of a new status that formally recognizes 
companion animals as a distinct legal category: “companion animal property.”  A separate 
legal category for companion animals has both intuitive appeal and would better reflect the way 
in which we value companion animals in our society.  In addition to recognizing the bonds 
between humans and animals, formally creating a new legal category for companion animals 
leads to more consistency in the law and would help to make sense of a number of judicial and 
legislative trends that have been emerging in the past decade or more.    
Changing the legal status of animals has many positive implications for the veterinary 
profession.  Previous opposition to such change – driven primarily by fears about increased 
malpractice awards – should give way to recognition of the numerous ways the veterinary 
profession will benefit from enhancing the legal status of companion animals.  It is ultimately in 
the best interest of the profession to raise the status of companion animals above that of 
inanimate property. 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction....................................................................................................................... 3 
 
Part I:  Traditional view of animals as property ........................................................... 7 
 
Part II: Changes in Damage Awards ............................................................................ 10 
A.  Reasonable Veterinary Expenses ............................................................................ 12 
 
1 See Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001) (“A companion dog is not a fungible item, 
equivalent to other items of personal property.  A companion dog is not a living room sofa or dining room furniture.  
This term inadequately and inaccurately describes the relationship between a human and a dog.”). 
 Law School Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law.  The author would like to thank 
Chelsey Moscati for her research assistance and for all of her help in shaping the presentation that led to this article, 
Dionne Koller for her many helpful comments, Susan McCarty for her research assistance, and Deans Karen 
Rothenberg and Richard Boldt for their generous support of this article.  This article was developed from an earlier 
presentation: Susan J. Hankin, From Property Owner to Guardian: The Changing Legal Relationship between 
People and Their Companion Animals, Panel Session at the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities Annual 
Meeting, Philadelphia, (Oct. 28, 2004). 
2B.  Actual Value to Owner ............................................................................................ 14 
C.  Mental Suffering of Owners as an Element of Damages ........................................ 16 
D.  Going Beyond the Changes Seen in the Courts ...................................................... 20 
1.  Changes in Statutory Law.................................................................................... 21 
2.  Proposals for Change Set Forth by Commentators.............................................. 23 
 
Part III:  Recognizing a Change in The Legal Status of Companion Animals ......... 25 
A.  Changes Evidenced by Language Used by Courts.................................................. 25 
B.  Court Decisions and Legislative Enactments that Recognize a Change in the Legal Status 
of Companion Animals.................................................................................................. 29 
1. Lost & Found Animal Disputes ........................................................................ 29 
2. Pet Custody Cases............................................................................................. 32 
3. Estates and Trusts ............................................................................................. 33 
a.  Judicial Decisions Voiding Clauses Instructing That Animals Be Destroyed . 33 
b.  Legislation creating binding pet trusts. ........................................................... 38 
4. Increased Penalties and Protections in Animal Cruelty Statutes ...................... 43 
5. Language Shift from “Owner” to “Guardian” .................................................. 48 
 
Part IV:  The Above Described Legal Changes Should Be Formally Recognized by 
Creating a New Legal Category for Companion Animals .......................................... 52 
A.  A New Legal Category: Companion Animal Property............................................ 55 
B. Comparisons to Other Proposals on Animals’ Legal Status................................... 56 
C.  A Suggested Starting Point to Defining Companion Animal Property ................... 59 
D.  Should Courts or Legislatures Enact Changes to Animals’ Legal Status?............. 62 
E.  Effects of Additional Distinctions Between and Within Species.............................. 65 
 
Part V: The Impact of a New Legal Status for Companion Animals on the Veterinary 
Profession......................................................................................................................... 67 
A.  Veterinary Opposition to Changing the Legal Status of Animals ........................... 68 
B.  Responses to Veterinary Opposition ....................................................................... 69 
C.  Potential Benefits to The Veterinary Profession of Changing The Legal Status of 
Companion Animals...................................................................................................... 72 
 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 82 
 
3Introduction
Veterinary medicine has gone through tremendous changes in the past several decades.  
Until fairly recently, veterinary practice was viewed primarily as a “service profession to 
agriculture,”2 that involved many rote practices such as vaccinating herds of cows.  In contrast, 
today’s veterinary practice focuses much more heavily on companion animal3 medicine and 
includes such specialty areas as veterinary oncology, veterinary orthopedics, veterinary 
cardiology, and even veterinary ophthalmology.4 In the ten years from 1991 to 2001, spending 
on veterinary care increased nearly three-fold, with expenditures totaling over nineteen billion 
dollars.5
Many of these changes can be attributed to the changing relationship that people have 
with their animals, and the growing role that our pets, or companion animals, play in our lives.  
Because of the way we value our pets, we are much more likely to spend money on their care, 
purchase pet health insurance, and expect that they will receive medical care when they are sick 
or injured akin to the treatment choices available in human medicine.6 In an interesting example 
of “coming full circle,” many human medical advances that were first tested in research 
 
2 See BERNARD E. ROLLIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO VETERINARY MEDICAL ETHICS: THEORY AND CASES 59 
(1999). 
3 Id. at 56.  “Companion animal” practice refers to treating animals such as dogs, cats and other small pets.  
Other categories of practice include “food animal” (bovine, small ruminants, porcine) and equine.  Id.
4 See Christopher Green, Comment, The Future of Veterinary Malpractice Liability in the Care of Companion 
Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 163, 211 (2004) (reporting that the vast majority of private veterinarians—eighty-three 
percent—work primarily or exclusively with companion animals). 
5 See Green, supra note 4, at 220 n.323; see also Rita Giordano, The Love of a Healthy Pet? Priceless, PHILA.
INQUIRER, June 20, 2004, at M1, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/news/local/8959918.htm (citing the 
American Veterinary Medicine Association). 
6 See Mary Margaret McEachern Nunalee & G. Robert Weedon, Modern Trends in Veterinary Malpractice: 
How Our Evolving Attitudes toward Non-human Animals Will Change Veterinary Medicine, 10 ANIMAL L. 125, 
139-40 (2004) (discussing pet owners’ desires to pursue sophisticated treatment and high-tech diagnostic tools for 
their pets).  See also Giordano, supra note 5 (“[I]ncreasingly, pet owners, acting as their animals’ health advocates 
as they might for any family member, are demanding cutting-edge treatments and sophisticated—and costly—
diagnostic procedures . . . .”). 
4experiments using animal models are now making their way back into veterinary medicine to 
treat sick animals.7 For example, choices of which chemotherapeutic agents to use to treat 
cancer in dogs and cats are often informed by which of those drugs have been successful in 
treating similar cancers in human patients.8
The changes in the way we value our animals are just beginning to be reflected in the 
law.  The traditional legal view that treats all animals as property is beginning to give way to an 
increasing recognition that animals are fundamentally different from inanimate property, and the 
law needs to treat them differently.  These legal changes are being seen to a limited extent in tort 
law—in the way that damages are calculated for lost or injured animals—but to a much greater 
extent in other areas of the law, such as estate planning, custody decisions, and increasing 
criminal penalties for cruelty to animals. 
These legal changes, inspired no doubt by the changes in the way we value companion 
animals in our society, may have implications for veterinary medicine and education that go 
beyond the changes in societal values that inspired them.  The potential effects on veterinary 
malpractice liability and damages awards have recently been explored by a number of 
commentators.9 Other potential effects have received less attention, such as how these changes 
are affecting the professional role of veterinarians, the realities of their practices, and their 
 
7 See Giordano, supra note 5 (“As the wonders of human medicine make their way into veterinary medicine at 
an ever-faster rate, animal care experts say pet owners . . . are learning how far they can go—and how much they 
can spend—to save their animal loved ones.”) 
8 See Fawn Vrazo, In Testing New Drugs, More than a Pet Cause, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 4, 2005, at A1 (“But 
while more new animal medications are coming to market . . . veterinarians and animal-welfare groups complain 
about a continuing lack of drugs that have been tested and approved specifically for pets.  There are no approved 
animal cancer chemotherapy drugs or diabetes drugs, for instance. . . .”); Jenny Donelan, Chemo Can Give a Dog 
and Owner More Time, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2005, at H3; Warren King, What Price a Pet’s Life?: $45,000 to 
Treat Comet, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A1 (noting that “[p]et owners may pay thousands for treatments once 
reserved for humans, including kidney transplants, gall-stone removal, hip replacements, and chemotherapy, 
radiation and surgery for cancer . . . .”).  See also Giordano, supra note 5 (reporting that University of Pennsylvania 
researchers are working on a tumor vaccine for both children and for pets). 
9 See, e.g., Green, supra note 4, at 163; Rebecca J. Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, 35 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 479 (2004); Jayne De Young, Article, Toward a More Equitable Approach to Causation in Veterinary 
Malpractice Actions, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 201 (205). 
5abilities to exercise their professional judgment. 
This article seeks to explore such implications of the legal changes we are beginning to 
see by focusing on the changing legal status of companion animals.  It will advocate for 
continuing a nascent movement away from the law’s traditional approach of treating all non-
human animals as property, propose a new legal category for companion animals, and discuss the 
implications of these changes for the veterinary profession. 
Part I will set out the traditional legal view where all animals are treated as property.  
This status is seen in cases involving an animal that is injured or lost through another’s 
negligence, where the owner10 is only able to recover the animal’s fair market value, and when 
“lost property” statutes are used to resolve disputes between losers and finders of lost animals.  
Part II will explore some recent changes in both case and statutory law that may be recognizing a 
different status for some animals.11 This section will conclude, however, that these judicial and 
legislative changes do not clearly reflect a change in the legal status of companion animals, but 
may rather merely indicate a different way of valuing this form of property. 
Part III will look at other areas where the law more clearly recognizes a different legal 
status for at least some animals.  In some cases, this recognition is seen in the language used by 
courts, whether or not that language actually affects the outcome of the decision.12 The article 
will argue that the language seen in these opinions reflects, at a minimum, an increasing 
 
10 One state and several local jurisdictions have statutorily changed this status from “owner” to “guardian.” See, 
e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-13-1.2(10) and § 4-19-2(28) (Supp. 2003) (adding the definition of “guardian” but not 
removing “Owner keeper”); BOULDER, COLO., CODE § 6-1-2 (2005) (“‘Guardian’ means owner”); BERKELEY, CAL., 
CODE § 10.04.010 (2001) (defining “Owner/guardian”); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE art. I § 41(m) (2003) 
(allowing “guardian” and “owner” to be used interchangeably in the Code). 
11 There are a number of different ways in which courts have held the value of companion animals to exceed 
fair market value, including allowing recovery of “reasonable veterinary expenses” even when those expenses far 
exceed animal’s market value; allowing recovery of “actual or intrinsic” value above market value; allowing 
recovery for an animal’s companionship and protective value; and allowing recovery of amounts that recognize the 
loss of companionship and mental suffering of the animal’s owner. See infra notes 48-110 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 140-152 and accompanying text. 
6discomfort that judges have with the legal status quo, and an increasing awareness that current 
laws are in conflict with the reality of how many people view their animals. This part of the 
article will then turn to case and statutory law that more clearly recognize a change in the legal 
status of companion animals.13 This section will conclude that there is in fact a trend to change 
the legal status of animals, a trend that more accurately reflects the value of companion animals 
in our society. 
Part IV of the article proposes that the above-described legal changes be formally 
recognized by creating a new legal category for companion animals.  This section will explore 
what that legal category might be, and how it could clarify, in ways that our current laws do not, 
the responsibilities that owners have toward their living property that are fundamentally different 
from responsibilities toward inanimate property.  Such a category should thus take into account 
the dependence that companion animals have on their human owners, their capacity to suffer if 
mistreated or neglected, and the bonds that we and our animals form with each other.  This 
section will advocate an incremental change that retains the property status of companion 
animals but accords them a place above inanimate property.  It will also look at the implications 
of creating additional legal distinctions both between14 and within15 species. 
The final section, Part V, will look at the implications of such a change on the veterinary 
profession.  The profession has shown some organized opposition to any changes in the legal 
 
13 Examples will include a Vermont case where the majority refused to apply a lost property statute to resolve a 
dispute between the loser and finder of a dog, despite the language in the statute that specified its application to 
“stray beasts” (see infra notes 145-158 and accompanying text); cases involving the custody of dogs and cats where 
courts apply a “best interest” standard (see infra notes 161-167 and accompanying text); and cases and statutes in 
the area of Estates and Trusts, including judicial decisions voiding clauses in wills that instruct that pets be 
destroyed and legislation that allows for the creation of binding pet trusts (see infra notes 168-208 and 
accompanying text).
14 While many laws, such as the federal Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-59 (2000), and many state 
animal cruelty statutes already treat animals differently by species, most of the recent legal changes apply only in 
cases of companion animals and will therefore increase the distinctions between species. 
15 To the extent that our legal rules depend on the animals’ roles in lives of humans, it is unclear how the law 
will treat animals within the same species that have different roles. 
7status of animals.  This section will respond to that opposition and will argue that it ultimately is 
misplaced: while veterinarians have some legitimate fears about increased malpractice awards, 
these fears are generally overblown, and they are far outweighed by the numerous ways their 
profession will benefit from enhancing the legal status of companion animals.  This section will 
conclude that it is ultimately in the best interests of the profession to support incremental 
changes in the legal status of companion animals – above that of inanimate property but not 
equivalent to personhood. 
Part I:  Traditional view of animals as property
The law has traditionally treated all non-human animals, including pets, as property.16 
Animals are generally categorized as either wild or domestic; pets, or companion animals, are 
one of several types of domestic animals.17 Wild animals are considered to be owned by the 
state18 (although that ownership can, in certain circumstances, be transferred to individuals), 
while domestic animals have individual owners.19 In many respects, our ownership of animals is 
identical to our ownership of inanimate property: we can buy and sell them, bequeath them in 
our wills, give them away, or choose to “destroy” them.20 Pet animals, like other forms of 
 
16 See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, Introduction: Animals as Property, 2 ANIMAL L., at i (1996); Harold W. 
Hannah, Animals as Property – Changing Concepts, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 571, 572 (2001).  See also Harabes v. The 
Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (“A review of decisions from other states 
reveals that pets are usually classified as personal property . . . .”). 
17 See Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of Companion 
Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 69 (2002) (citing JAMES F. WILSON, LAW AND ETHICS OF THE VETERINARY 
PROFESSION 74 (1988)).  See also Hannah, supra note 16, at 574-75. 
18 See Hannah, supra note 16, at 572 (footnote omitted): “While statutory provisions declare that ownership of 
wildlife is in the state, that ownership may be transferred to hunters and anglers providing they meet the licensing 
requirements and abide by hunting and fishing rules established in the state.”  But see David Favre, New Property 
Status for Animals: Equitable Self-Ownership, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 234, 
237 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) [hereinafter ANIMAL RIGHTS] (arguing that “[i]t is a 
misperception of existing property law to say that title is in the state when wildlife exists in its natural 
environment.”). 
19 Gary L. Francione, Animals – Property or Persons?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 108. 
20 See id. at 117.  State statutes prohibiting animal cruelty do, however, place some limits on how we treat our 
animal property, and while they do place limits on an owner’s choice of how to have an animal killed, they generally 
do not question an owner’s choice to have an animal humanely euthanized for what may be a trivial reason. 
8personal property, can be the subjects of theft21 and subjects of bailment agreements.22 If we 
leave our animals at the veterinarian’s office beyond a certain period of time, or do not pay our 
bill, the professionals can take ownership of them in much the same way that a garage can take 
ownership of our cars.23 
This animal-as-property approach is frequently seen in tort cases involving damages for a 
negligently lost or injured animal, where courts are only willing to award the “fair market value” 
as they would for any other form of property.  For example, plaintiffs in an Alaska case located 
their missing dog at a local pound and attempted to retrieve him.24 Told that the pound was 
closed for the day, they arrived earlier the next day after leaving work early, but found that the 
pound had already killed their dog, in violation of a local ordinance that required a seventy-two 
hour holding period.25 The pound admitted liability and the only issue at trial was damages.26 In 
affirming the lower court’s jury instructions, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the proper 
measure of damages was the market value of the dog and not the owner’s subjective estimation 
of the pet’s value.27 
The legal status of animals as property is also apparent when “lost property” law is used 
 
21 See, e.g., 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-601(a) (Supp. 2005) (“All dogs are hereby declared to be personal 
property and subjects of theft.”).  See also the federal Pet Theft Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2000) (stating that among the 
Animal Welfare Act’s purposes is “to protect the owners of animals from the theft of their animals . . . .”). 
22 See, e.g., Price v. Brown, 680 A.2d 1149, 1151 (Pa. 1996) (holding that, while dogs are personal property and 
can thus be subjects of bailment agreements, “allegations of breach of a bailment agreement are insufficient to state 
a cause of action against a veterinarian who . . . perform[s] surgery on an animal” that does not survive). 
23 See, e.g., 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-601(c)(2) (Supp. 2005) (setting forth provision regarding 
abandonment of animals where an “animal placed in the custody of a licensed doctor of veterinary medicine for 
treatment, boarding or other care, . . . which shall be abandoned by its owner or his representative for a period of 
more than ten days after written notice . . . may be turned over to the custody of the nearest humane society . . . .”) 
24 Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 455 (Alaska 1985). 
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 456.  See also Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 313 (Alaska 2001) (footnote omitted) (“The majority 
rule holds that the proper measure of recovery for the killing of a dog is the dog’s fair market value at the time of its 
death.”).  The Mitchell court, however, chose the minority position and awarded damages representing “the actual 
value of the pet to the owner.”  Id.
9to resolve disputes between losers and finders of lost animals,28 and where property dissolution 
law is used to determine a pet’s fate during a divorce settlement.  In a recent Pennsylvania case, 
for example, former spouses had entered into a property settlement agreeing that their dog would 
live with the wife, but allowing the husband to visit him.29 When the wife moved and no longer 
allowed her former husband to visit the dog, he filed a complaint seeking shared custody.30 The 
court dismissed the complaint, holding that any terms in the agreement attempting to award 
visitation or shared custody were void, because dogs are considered personal property under 
Pennsylvania law.31 In affirming the trial court’s dismissal, the Superior Court agreed that 
“Appellant is seeking an arrangement analogous, in law, to a visitation schedule for a table or a 
lamp.”32 
Despite their treatment as property in many areas of the law, there are other ways in 
which animals have long been treated differently from non-animate property: state statutes 
prohibiting cruelty to animals have been on the books since as early as the 1800s33 and, by some 
accounts, go back as early as 1641 to the legal code of Massachusetts Bay Colony.34 No similar 
laws exist that prohibit “cruelty” to inanimate property.  Animals are treated differently from 
inanimate property in practical ways as well.  Unlike other “property,” animals possess an ability 
to move that can be exercised independently from their owner’s wishes, and certain laws that 
recognize this ability exist, if for no other reason than to assure an original owner’s property 
 
28 See, e.g., Williams v. McMahan, No. 26983-0-II, 2002 WL 242538 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2002). 
29 See Desanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230, 231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). 
30 Id.
31 Id. at 232 (citing 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-601(a).
32 Id.
33 Gary Francione cites an 1821 Maine statute as “[t]he first known anti-cruelty statute in the United States.”  
See Francione, supra note 19, at 135, n.14; while other commentators cite to a New York statute that dates to 1866.  
See, e.g., William A. Reppy, Jr., Citizen Standing to Enforce Anti-Cruelty Laws by Obtaining Injunctions: The North 
Carolina Experience, 11 ANIMAL L. 39, 46 n.38 (2005) (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. ch. 783, 1-10 (1866)). 
34 This “Body of Liberties” prohibited “any Tirrany or Crueltie towards any bruite Creature which are usuallie 
kept for man’s use.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 251, 252. 
10
right.35 
While valuing animals as property is still the prevailing view, there have been some 
recent changes in both case and statutory law that may be recognizing a different status for some 
animals.  In cases involving the calculation of damage awards, the changes may not so clearly 
reflect a change in the legal status of companion animals, but may rather merely indicate a 
different way of valuing this form of property.36 In other cases, recognition of a different status 
for companion animals can be seen in the language used by courts, whether or not that language 
actually affects the outcome of the decision.37 And in yet other examples of changes in both case 
and statutory law, we see results that more clearly recognize a change in the legal status of 
companion animals.38 
Part II: Changes in Damage Awards
A great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the problems with using fair market 
value as a measure of damages for lost or injured companion animals, and the current approach 
has been criticized by numerous commentators.39 Commentators have asserted, for example, 
that the current approach has failed to “[keep] up with the reality of the relationship between 
 
35 See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 41 (1995) (describing the historical legal 
classes of animals, domestic or wild, and the property rights assigned to each class). 
36 See supra Part II. 
37 See supra Part III A. 
38 See supra Part III B. 
39 See Elaine T. Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful Death Cases:  A Survey of Current Court 
and Legislative Action and a Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 215, 225 
(2003); Geordie Duckler, The Economic Value of Companion Animals: A Legal and Anthropological Argument for 
Special Valuation, 8 ANIMAL L. 199, 200 (2002); Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving Confusion in Pet Owner Tort Cases: 
Recognizing Pets’ Anthropomorphic Qualities Under a Property Classification, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31, 32 (2001); 
Huss, supra note 17, at 47; Margit Livingston, The Calculus of Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy, 82 
NEB. L. REV. 783 (2004); William C. Root, Note, “Man’s Best Friend”: Property or Family Member? An 
Examination of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages Recoverable for Their 
Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423, 444 (2002); Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of Floyd: 
Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1087 (1995); Sonia S. Waisman & 
Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of “Non-Economic” Damages for Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion Animals: 
A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7 ANIMAL L. 45, 60 (2001). 
11
companion animals and their human caretakers,”40 because it fails to recognize the value that 
many people place on their animals, and leads to both undercompensation41 and 
underdeterrence42 in many legal disputes, including the failure to deter veterinarians from 
harming the animals in their care.43 
The problem with compensating only for the fair market value of companion animals is 
illustrated by a story that was recently reported in the Philadelphia Inquirer.44 Warren Clein was 
standing in his own driveway with his dog, Daisy, when they were attacked by a neighbor’s 
rottweiler that had gotten loose from its yard.  Daisy, who was badly injured in the attack, was 
taken to Veterinary Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (VHUP), where she underwent 
extensive surgery, and spent five days in intensive care.  The bill from VHUP totaled $5265.  
Even in the likely possibility that the Cleins are able to establish liability on the part of their 
neighbors, they will not be able to recover the amount they spent on Daisy’s surgery and 
recuperation, because that amount exceeds her “fair market value” by over $5000.  The Cleins 
had adopted Daisy, a mix-breed terrier, from a shelter for a $50 fee, and Pennsylvania law does 
not allow recovery above the dog’s replacement value.45 
Inequities with the “fair market value” approach can be readily seen in the outcome of 
this case.  If Daisy’s “market value” were really the proper measure of her worth to the Cleins, 
 
40 Huss, supra note 17, at 52. 
41 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 39, at 816-17. 
42 See, e.g., Byszewski, supra note 39, at 232. 
43 See Green, supra note 4, at 168. 
44 See Stuart Ditzen, Challenging Pa. Law on a Pet’s Value: Couple Seek to Recoup Vet Costs after Dog Attack,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 5, 2004, at A1. 
45 Id. The approach reported in the article is consistent with a 1988 case where the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
refused to compensate the owner of a mixed-breed dog who had been negligently killed for loss of companionship 
or emotional distress: “Under Pennsylvania law, a dog is personal property.  The fundamental purpose of damages 
for an injury to or destruction of property by tortious conduct of another is to compensate the injured party for actual 
loss suffered. . . .  [W]here the property has been destroyed, the measure of damages would be the value of the 
property prior to its destruction.  Appellants, however, claim that their dog was a unique chattel whose value to them 
exceeded the monetary value of a mongrel dog.  While the appellants undoubtedly had a sentimental attachment to 
their dog, this would not make it unique chattel under the law.”  Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1988) (citations omitted). 
12
then, upon realizing the extent of her injuries, they would likely choose to have her humanely 
euthanized and then return to the shelter for another $50 replacement dog.46 But few would 
criticize the Cleins’ decision to take the course they chose: spending over $5000 for Daisy’s 
surgery and hospitalization so they could have their own dog “made whole.”  If the decision to 
spend the money on the dog’s surgery was a reasonable one, and her injuries were caused by 
another’s negligence, then it seems to follow that the negligent party should be liable for paying 
those damages.47 But that is not often the outcome when pets are lumped into the same category 
as other personal property, and owners can only recover for their fair market value. 
A number of courts, however, are beginning to change their approach.  In cases involving 
injuries to or losses of companion animals, there are a number of different ways in which courts 
have held their value to exceed “fair market value.”  These approaches include allowing recovery 
of “reasonable veterinary expenses” even when those expenses far exceed an animal’s market 
value; allowing recovery of “actual or intrinsic” value above market value; allowing recovery for 
an animal’s companionship and protective value; and allowing recovery of amounts that 
recognize the loss of companionship and mental suffering of the animal’s owner. 
A.  Reasonable Veterinary Expenses 
In a case with facts remarkably similar to the Pennsylvania case described above, a New 
Jersey court allowed recovery of “reasonable veterinary expenses” even when those expenses 
exceeded the animal’s market value by fivefold.48 Heather Hyland’s ten-year-old Shih Tzu was 
 
46 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 39, at 792 n.61 (“[G]iven the hundreds of thousands of homeless animals in 
the United States, it is quite simple to obtain a pet at a relatively low cost.”)  But see Green, supra note 4, at 208 
(noting that the magazine DVM termed the choice of euthanasia over treatment “economic euthanasia” and that 
owners’ dollar-figure cutoff has been rising, indicating more than simple replacement cost is involved (citing Daniel 
R. Verdon, Clients Spending More Before Stopping Treatment, DVM MAG., June 2003, at 1)). 
47 Holding the Rottweiler’s owner liable would likely serve not only the tort system’s “corrective justice” goals, 
but also the instrumental goal of risk distribution, since such liability is likely to be covered by one’s homeowner’s 
insurance. 
48 Hyland v. Borras, 719 A.2d 662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).  See also Zager v. Dimilia, 524 N.Y.S.2d 
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attacked and seriously injured by a neighbor’s bulldog that had trespassed onto her property.  
Hyland spent $2500 on treatment for her dog, five times more than the cost of buying a new Shih 
Tzu.49 The defendant bulldog-owners appealed the award of Hyland’s veterinary expenses, 
claiming that the proper measure of damages for personal property, such as the dog, is its 
replacement cost in cases where the “repair costs outweigh the replacement cost.”50 The court 
disagreed with this defense, holding that it was “purely a matter of ‘good sense’ that defendants 
be required to ‘make good the injury done’ as the result of their negligence by reimbursing 
plaintiff for the necessary and reasonable expenses she incurred to restore the dog to its condition 
before the attack.”51 In reaching this decision, the court explicitly recognized that pets belong in 
a different category from other types of personal property.52 
Other states are relying on legislative changes to recognize reasonable veterinary 
expenses as a measure of damages for injured companion animals.  For example, in a recently 
approved amendment to a Maryland statute that otherwise limits damages for the injury or death 
of a pet to compensatory damages, the legislature expanded the definition of “compensatory 
damages” to include “the reasonable and necessary cost of veterinary care” in cases involving 
either the death or injury to a pet.53 By recognizing that veterinary expenses which may greatly 
exceed an animal’s market value properly can be recovered when an animal is killed or injured 
 
968, 970 (Village Justice Ct. 1988) (finding that the proper measure of damages in a case involving injury suffered 
by a pet animal is the reasonable and necessary cost of reasonable veterinary treatment). 
49 Hyland, 719 A.2d at 662. 
50 Id. at 663. 
51 Id. at 664.  The court went on to say that “[i]mposing these economic losses on defendants not only has the 
salutary effect of making plaintiff whole, but it deters an owner of an aggressive dog from negligently allowing it to 
run loose, such as occurred here.”  Id.
52 See id.: 
Most animals kept for companionship have no calculable market value beyond the subjective 
value of the animal to its owner, and that value arises purely as the result of their relationship and 
the length and strength of the owner’s attachment to the animal.  In that sense then, a household 
pet is not like other fungible or disposable property, intended solely to be used and replaced after it 
has outlived its usefulness. 
53 Act of Apr. 26, 2005, ch. 250, 2005 Md. Laws 1301-02 (to be codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 11-110(a)(2)). 
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through another’s negligence, both courts and legislators are finding that fair market value, 
alone, is often not a proper measure of damages. 
B.  Actual Value to Owner 
Several courts have allowed recovery amounts above an animal’s market value by taking 
into account the animal’s intrinsic value or its actual value to its owner.  In Brousseau v. 
Rosenthal,54 for example, the court awarded damages when an eight-year-old mixed breed dog 
was negligently killed at defendant’s boarding kennel.  While finding that the dog had “no 
ascertainable market value,” the court nevertheless held that, in order to make the owner whole, 
it must assess the dog’s actual value to its owner.55 The owner in this case was an elderly 
woman who lived alone and relied on the dog for companionship and protection.56 The court 
therefore included loss of companionship57 and protection value as elements of damages.58 
Another approach to calculating the animal’s actual value to its owner is to look at what 
the owners have been willing to spend on the animal, including their investments in the pet’s 
veterinary care.  In a case involving one neighbor’s shooting of another’s dog, the Alaska 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the case, which was based on the grounds 
that no compensatory damages were available because the dog had no market value.59 In 
reversing, the Supreme Court held that the court was correct in its conclusion that damages could 
 
54 443 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980). 
55 Id. at 286. 
56 Id.
57 Note, however, that courts in various jurisdictions, including New York, have traditionally rejected loss of 
companionship as an independent cause of action for the loss of a companion animal.  See Gluckman v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Lewis v. Di Donna 743 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); see 
also Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Inc., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Harabes v. The Barkery, 
Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785 
N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
58 Brousseau, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 286. 
59 Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309 (Alaska 2001). 
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not include either sentimental or companionship value.60 Nevertheless, the court found that the 
correct measure of compensatory damages was not fair market value, but rather “value to the 
owner.”61 The court suggested that there were a number of different ways to calculate value to 
the owner: 
[A]n owner may seek reasonable replacement costs--including such items as the 
cost of purchasing a puppy of the same breed, the cost of immunization, the cost 
of neutering the pet, and the cost of comparable training.  Or an owner may seek 
to recover the original cost of the dog, including the purchase price and, again, 
such investments as immunization, neutering, and training.62 
While acknowledging that the standard damages calculation may not adequately compensate the 
pet owner for the loss,63 the court reiterated its refusal to include sentimental value 64 as a 
component of actual value.65 
Using similar reasoning, an Ohio court showed a willingness to adopt an “actual value to 
owner” standard when an eight-year-old shepherd was partially paralyzed by negligent surgery.66 
Citing the great time and effort the plaintiff had invested in training her dog, the years she spent 
trying to rehabilitate him after his surgery, and the dog’s unique nature as “personally suited to 
showing and for [plaintiff’s] personal security,” the court awarded $5000 in damages to the 
plaintiff.67 Like the Alaska court, however, this court would not include “sentimentality” as an 
element of damages.68 
60 Id. at 312. 
61 Id. at 313. 
62 Id. at 314. 
63 The court acknowledged in a footnote that “a small minority of jurisdictions has recognized that the value of a 
pet dog may include sentimental or companionship value.”  See id. at 313 n.20. 
64 Even where courts have allowed sentimental value for the loss of a pet, they may not be treating pets 
differently than other forms of property which have little market value, but great value to the person who owns it. In 
many ways, this type of valuation mirrors a finding of sentimental value for property such as heirlooms; however at 
least one court in NY has explicitly distinguished the value of a companion animal from value of an heirloom.  See 
Corso v. Crawford Cat & Dog Hosp., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979). 
65 Mitchell, 27 P.3d at 314. 
66 McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 750 (Ct. Claims Ohio 1994). 
67 Id. at 752. 
68 Id.
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More recent cases have attached even higher amounts to a pet’s value to its owner.  In a 
much publicized 2004 veterinary malpractice case from Orange County, California – billed in 
several news reports69 as the largest damage award to date in a veterinary malpractice case – a 
jury found that a rescued dog with a market value of only $10 had a unique value to its owner 
that amounted to $30,000.70 And even more recently, a woman whose cat was mauled by a 
neighbor’s dog was awarded $45,000: $30,000 for the pet’s special value and $15,000 for 
emotional distress.71 
C.  Mental Suffering of Owners as an Element of Damages 
Courts have shown a general unwillingness to award damages for the owners’ mental 
suffering when their companion animal is injured or killed.  In the vast majority of these cases 
where claims for mental suffering are disallowed, it is often because the courts decline to extend 
such claims to the injury or death of something that the law considers to be property.  In the few 
cases where courts have allowed mental distress claims, it is almost always in the context of a 
claim for intentional – and not negligent – infliction of emotional distress, where the behavior of 
the defendant has been particularly egregious, enough so to meet the outrageousness element of 
the claim.  It is not always clear, in these cases, whether the courts would be similarly willing to 
extend emotional distress damages to a loss of inanimate property.  In at least one case, however, 
a court made clear that emotional distress damages were in fact available for the negligent 
destruction of property. 
 
69 See, e.g., Riley Jason, Man Sues Vet Over Dog’s Death, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 18, 2005, 
at 1A; Philip Sherwell, Now Pets Are Really Part of the Family, Thanks to U.S. “Paw Laws”, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH 
(London), June 26, 2005, at 27; Laura Parker, When Pets Die at the Vet, Grieving Owners Call Lawyers, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 15, 2005, at 1A. 
70 See William Hageman, Paw law: Is Your Pet Entitled to his Day in Court? The Answer: Maybe, CHI. TRIB., 
June 5, 2005, at Q1.  The jury awarded an additional $9000 in veterinary bills.  Id. 
71 Warren Cornwall & Craig Welch, $45,480 Ruling in Cat’s Death, SEATTLE TIMES, May 9, 2005, at A1; 
Associated Press, Woman gets $45K for Cat Killed by Dog, ABC NEWS, May 9, 2005, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=740793.
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There are numerous examples of cases where courts have disallowed damages for mental 
suffering precisely because of the property status of the killed or injured animal.72 More unusual 
are cases like Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, where a Hawaii court allowed an 
emotional distress claim for the negligent loss of a pet despite the animal’s status as property.73 
The Campbell’s family dog, Princess, died from heat prostration when the state Animal 
Quarantine Station negligently transported her in an unventilated van on a hot day.74 After 
hearing evidence of the family’s distress upon hearing of their pet’s death, the trial court found 
the state liable and awarded damages both for the loss of the dog and for the family’s emotional 
distress.75 Defendants appealed the award of damages for emotional distress, on the grounds that 
such damages were not proper when the loss involved personal property.76 Hawaii’s Supreme 
Court rejected this argument, noting that Hawaii’s “unique approach to the area of recovery for 
mental distress . . . allowed recovery for mental distress suffered as the result of the negligent 
destruction of property.”77 Not surprisingly, this approach has not been followed in other 
jurisdictions, which allow negligent infliction of emotional distress claims only in a narrow range 
of circumstances. 
Courts have shown more of a willingness to award emotional distress damages when pets 
are killed or injured due to intentional, rather than negligent conduct, especially where the 
defendant’s behavior is particularly egregious.  In Burgess v. Taylor,78 for example, where 
 
72 See, e.g., Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc., 
844 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Harabes v. The Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001).  See also 
Myers v. City of Hartford, 853 A.2d 621 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (where an appellate court held that the common law 
did not recognize emotional distress claims for “injury to such property as a pet.” Id. at 625). 
73 632 P.2d 1066 (Haw. 1981). 
74 Id. at 1067. 
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1071. 
77 Id. (citation omitted). 
78 44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). 
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defendant lied to the plaintiff horse-owner and sold her horses to a known slaughter-buyer,79 the 
court rejected defendant’s contention that the award should have been limited to the horses’ fair 
market value because of their status as property.80 Rather, the court found that, in determining 
whether there is a viable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is “the conduct 
of the offender rather than the subject of the conduct that determines whether the conduct was 
outrageous.”81 The court thus found a viable emotional distress claim, despite the horses’ status 
as property. 
The same court next addressed the question of emotional distress damages for the loss of 
a pet animal when plaintiffs brought a claim against the county dog warden for impounding and 
shooting their family dog.82 Citing Burgess for the proposition that “[s]imply because a claim 
involves an animal does not preclude a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,”83 
the court nevertheless found that such a claim was not supported here where there was the 
required element of intent was not met: there was no evidence that the defendant intended to 
inflict harm on the family.84 The difference between the outcomes of these two cases can be 
explained by the nature of the respective defendants’ conduct: where the conduct of the 
 
79 Id. at 809.  The story’s details highlight the egregious nature of the defendant’s behavior: Plaintiff Taylor 
owned two Appaloosa horses, Poco and P.J., that she kept as pets.  When she found herself in circumstances where 
she could no longer care for her pet horses, Taylor entered into "free-lease agreement" with defendant Burgess.  
Under this arrangement, Burgess, who had a farm with her own horses, would take care of Poco and P.J. in 
exchange for the enjoyment of having them; Taylor, in turn, would remain the horses’ owner and could visit them 
whenever she liked.   However, within days of taking possession of the horses, Burgess contacted Jackson, a known 
slaughter-buyer, and sold the horses to him for $1000.  When Taylor contacted Burgess in an attempt to visit her 
horses about a week later, Burgess lied to her, and invented a story about giving them to Randolph.  Randolph, in 
turn, gave Taylor vague directions to a fictitious location, where she tried in vain to search for her horses.  Id. 
80 Id. at 812. 
81 Id. at 809.  The court went on to find that:  
[T]he Burgesses’ conduct clearly rises to the level of being outrageous and intolerable in that it offends 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality, certainly a situation “in which the recitation of the facts to an 
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 
‘Outrageous!’” Id. at 811 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46, cmt. d (1965)). 
82 Ammon v. Welty 113 S.W.3d 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002). 
83 Id. at 188. 
84 Id.
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defendants in Burgess was found to be both intentional and outrageous; the defendant’s conduct 
in Ammon did not meet either of these required elements.85 
Similar analysis was employed by the Third Circuit when it held that, under Pennsylvania 
law, the wrongful killing of a pet dog could support a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.86 Plaintiff’s pet Rottweiler, Immi, had escaped from its yard and wandered 
into the next door alley.87 A police officer, passing in his patrol car, stopped and confronted the 
dog.88 Although the dog was not in any way aggressive toward the officer, he reached for his 
gun.89 The plaintiff then saw what was happening and shouted that the dog was hers and not to 
shoot.90 After briefly hesitating, the officer proceeded to shoot the dog five times, killing it.91 
Plaintiffs brought multiple claims against the police officer and other defendants, including a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.92 Despite defendant’s argument that “the 
killing of a pet under any circumstances would not be recognized by Pennsylvania courts as 
extreme or outrageous,”93 the court upheld the claim: 
Given the strength of community sentiment against at least extreme forms of 
animal abuse and the substantial emotional investment that pet owners frequently 
make in their pets, we would not expect the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to 
rule out all liability predicated on the killing of a pet.94 
The court distinguished several Pennsylvania cases that found against such claims, on the 
 
85 This distinction easily explains the difference in outcome between the two cases.  It is not the case, as one 
commentator suggested, simply that courts are failing to be consistent in measuring damages for the death of pet 
animals.  See Green, supra note 4, at 166 (“modern courts actually are moving further away from consensus on the 
companion animal valuation question”) and id. at 166 n.9 (citing Burgess and Ammon as examples of such lack of 
consensus). 
86 Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001). 
87 Id. at 209. 
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 217. 
93 Id. at 218. 
94 Id.
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grounds that these cases involved either negligent behavior or behavior that was not intended to 
inflict severe emotional distress on the animals’ owners.95 Here, in contrast, the court found that 
“a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Officer Eberly shot Immi either intending to cause 
Kim Brown severe emotional distress or with the knowledge that the infliction of such distress 
on her would be virtually certain.”96 
While Burgess, Ammon, and Muhlenberg make clear that a claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress will not fail simply because it involves a pet animal, it is less clear if the 
courts would have been as likely to find the outrageous element met in a case involving 
inanimate property rather than pet horses and dogs.  The Muhlenberg court’s language, 
particularly its reference to the “substantial emotional investment that pet owners frequently 
make in their pets”97 suggests that animals hold a special place.  While it is certainly possible, 
perhaps likely, that the plaintiffs’ relationships with their animals played a significant role in 
courts’ findings that behavior which resulted in animal’s destruction or injury was outrageous, it 
is also possible to imagine similar findings when defendants behave particularly egregiously in 
destroying inanimate property, such as irreplaceable family photographs, to which a plaintiff has 
a strong sentimental attachment.  Thus, while numerous courts have categorically denied 
emotional distress damages for the killing of animals, the few courts that have allowed such 
damages have generally done so on theories that might apply to inanimate as well as animate 
property.98 
D.  Going Beyond the Changes Seen in the Courts 
 
95 Id. (discussing Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), and Miller v. Peraino, 626 A.2d 637 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1993)). 
96 Id. at 219. 
97 269 F.3d at 218. 
98 And in Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, explicitly so.  632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw. 1981). 
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Despite the large number of cases where plaintiffs have challenged the general rule that 
only allows recovery for an animal’s fair market value, few courts have diverged very far from 
this standard.  While many courts do appear sympathetic to such claims,  most also see their 
choices as being limited by existing law, and few courts seem to see themselves in a position to 
change that law.  In some cases, intermediate appellate courts have deferred to higher courts to 
make these changes in the laws,99 while in others, the courts defer to legislative bodies to make 
such changes.100 Given the unwillingness of most courts to make such changes, it is not 
surprising that we are beginning to see legislative response in a number of states.  It is also 
unsurprising that many of the proposals set forth by commentators who advocate continuing this 
trend seek to build on these legislative responses. 
1.  Changes in Statutory Law
Tennessee was the first state to enact legislation increasing the damages allowed for a lost 
or injured animal.101 Known as the T-Bo Act of 2000, and named for the pet Shih Tzu of the 
state legislator who proposed the bill,102 the Tennessee statute allows recovery for non-economic 
damages for the loss of a pet, including “reasonably expected society, companionship, love and 
affection for the pet.”103 While going further than most common law extensions by explicitly 
allowing the recovery of non-economic damages, the Tennessee law contains a number of 
limitations, including a damage limit of $4000,104 and exemptions for non-profit entities, 
 
99 See Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 565 (Tex. App. 2004). 
100 See, e.g., Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp. 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that 
emotional distress damages are not available for death of a dog because pets are personal property, but inviting 
plaintiff and others to urge the Legislature to “visit this issue in light of public policy considerations . . . .”) 
101 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (Supp. 2005). 
102 See McEachern Nunalee & Weedon, supra note 6, at 144. 
103 TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(d) (Supp. 2005). 
104 Interestingly, this damage cap of $4000 in a statute that increases the allowed categories of damages is 
considerably lower than the $7500 cap on damages in a Maryland statute that was enacted to limit the damages for 
the death or injury to a pet to compensatory damages.  See Act of Apr. 26, 2005, ch. 250, 2005 Md. Laws 1301-02 
(to be codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-110(a)(2)). 
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government agencies, and licensed veterinarians.105 It also limits its application to dogs and 
cats;106 any other lost pet would not be covered by the statute. 
A 2004 Connecticut statute is even more limited.107 This enactment limits its coverage to 
domesticated dogs and cats,108 only applies when a companion animal is intentionally,109 not 
negligently, killed or injured, and does not expand recovery to non-economic damages.110 The 
law does, however, expand the range of economic damages that can be recovered “including, but 
not limited to, expenses of veterinary care, the fair monetary value of the companion animal and 
burial expenses for the companion animal.”111 Under this law, an owner whose animal was 
intentionally injured would presumably be able to recover the costs of treating such injuries, 
even if those costs were in excess of the animal’s fair market value.  This law also allows courts 
to award punitive damages, but provides exemptions to such awards similar to the exemptions 
set out in the Tennessee statute.112 
Illinois has chosen a somewhat different approach to recognizing awards of non-
economic damages, by including such a provision for civil actions in its Humane Care for 
 
105 Id. § 44-17-403 (a) & (e). 
106 See id. § 44-17-403 (b): “As used in this section, ‘pet’ means any domesticated dog or cat normally 
maintained in or near the household of its owner.” 
107 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-351a (West Supp. 2005) (Liability for intentionally killing or injuring 
companion animal). 
108 Id. § 22-351a(a).  The statute explicitly excludes any “dog or cat kept for farming or biomedical research 
practices.”  Id.
109 The law exempts persons who kill an animal “in defense of such person or another person or as otherwise 
authorized by law.”  Id. § 22-351a(b). 
110 Id. § 22-351(b). 
111 Id. § 22-351(b). 
112 See id. § 22-351(c) and (d): 
The court shall not assess punitive damages and a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to subsection 
(c) of this section against: (1) A veterinarian licensed pursuant to chapter 384 while following 
accepted standards of practice of the profession, (2) the state or any political subdivision of the 
state or any employee, officer or agent thereof while acting within the scope of such employee’s, 
officer’s or agent’s employment or official duties, or (3) an employee of or volunteer for a 
nonprofit organization or nonprofit corporation organized and operated exclusively for the 
prevention of cruelty to animals or the protection of stray, abandoned or mistreated animals while 
acting within the scope of such employee’s or volunteer’s employment or duties. 
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Animals Act, the state anti-cruelty statute.113 Section 16.3 of the Act allows an animal’s owner 
to bring a civil action against someone who kills or injures her animal, but only where the 
defendant commits aggravated cruelty114 or torture115 as defined by the Act, or if the defendant 
kills an animal while acting in bad faith under the Act’s sections 3.06 (dealing with the 
disposition of seized companion animals and animals used for fighting purposes)116 or section 12 
(impounding animals).117 As long as these conditions are met, however, the statute allows a 
broad range of damages: 
Damages may include, but are not limited to, the monetary value of the animal, 
veterinary expenses incurred on behalf of the animal, any other expenses incurred 
by the owner in rectifying the effects of the cruelty, pain, and suffering of the 
animal, and emotional distress suffered by the owner.  In addition to damages that 
may be proven, the owner is also entitled to punitive or exemplary damages of not 
less than $500 but not more than $25,000 for each act of abuse or neglect to 
which the animal was subjected.  In addition, the court must award reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs actually incurred by the owner in the prosecution of any 
action under this Section.118 
Illinois thus takes a very expansive stance on the types of damages that can be awarded in a civil 
action, including even damages for the owner’s emotional distress.  It places limitations, 
however, on the situations where such damages are available, by requiring not just intentional 
behavior but bad faith, torture, and aggravated cruelty. 
2.  Proposals for Change Set Forth by Commentators
Several of the commentators who have criticized the current approach to the valuation of 
animals have set forth proposals that build on these legislative models.  Waisman and Newell, 
 
113 Humane Care for Animals Act, 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 et. seq. (West 2004). 
114 The Act defines aggravated cruelty as “intentionally commit[ting] an act that causes a companion animal to 
suffer serious injury or death.”  510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3.02 (West 2004). 
115 Torture is committed “when that person without legal justification knowingly or intentionally tortures an 
animal.  For purposes of this Section, and subject to subsection (b), ‘torture’ means infliction of or subjection to 
extreme physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering, or agony of the animal.”  
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3.03(a) (West 2004). 
116 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3.06 (West 2004). 
117 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/12 (West 2004). 
118 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16.3 (West 2004). 
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who criticize the Tennessee statute as “extremely limited in scope, probably due to political 
exigencies in that particular state,”119 propose legislation that would be much more 
comprehensive in compensating for the injury or loss of a companion animal: 
[D]amages shall be recoverable for the human companion’s mental anguish, 
emotional distress, and other non-economic injuries, including the loss of society, 
companionship, comfort, protection and services; for veterinary and other special 
care required; for reasonable burial expenses; for court costs and attorney’s fees, 
and other reasonable damages resulting from the willful, wanton, reckless or 
negligent act or omission.120 
Another commentator, Margit Livingston, proposes compensating owners for the loss of 
intangible elements of the human-animal relationship, including loss of companionship of the 
animal for a “reasonable replacement period,” and compensation for the “mental anguish 
experienced by plaintiffs upon the untimely death of their companion animal . . . .”121 Yet 
another proposal builds on approaches taken by the few courts that have been willing to extend 
damages beyond market value, proposing that courts use a “value to owner” standard, including 
a loss of companionship component, and advocating for the award of punitive damages “where 
the conduct of the defendant is particularly heinous.”122 Byszewski presents an interesting 
proposal that builds on an idea first adopted by a court in a wrongful death suit for a negligently 
killed child.123 Applying the court’s “loss of investment” approach to negligently killed animals, 
she proposes that courts use the expected cost of care over the animal’s life expectancy had it not 
been killed to estimate the animal’s true value to its owner or guardian, including its 
companionship value.124 
119 Waisman & Newell, supra note 39, at 70. 
120 Id. at 72.  The proposal also includes punitive damages when willful, wanton, or reckless conduct causes the 
death or injury of an animal companion.  Id.
121 Livingston, supra note 39, at 844. 
122 Epstein, supra note 39, at 48. 
123 Byszewski, supra note 39, at 233-36. 
124 Id. at 235. 
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All of these proposals, and to a lesser extent the statutes,125 take a different approach 
from the judicial decisions that have allowed for valuation above an animal’s market value.  
Unlike the case law, these proposals look to change the law by recognizing that the legal status 
of animals should be different from that of inanimate property, and the calculation of damages 
awards should reflect that difference. 
Part III:  Recognizing a Change in The Legal Status of Companion Animals
Most of the courts that have allowed damage awards above an animal’s fair market value 
do not, ultimately, say anything changing the legal status of animals to something other than 
property.  Rather, these courts merely seem to be looking at different ways of valuing this form 
of property.126 In a few cases, however, courts have actually been willing to entertain the idea 
that animals are in a different legal category than inanimate property.  One of the ways we see 
this recognition is in the language that courts use in deciding cases involving the loss or injury of 
companion animals.  In some cases, this language may actually affect outcome of the court’s 
opinion; in others, however, the language is merely dicta, and effects no changes in the law.  
A.  Changes Evidenced by Language Used by Courts  
Language from Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc.,127 a case decided by the 
Queens County Civil Court in New York, has been cited numerous times by courts, 
commentators, and advocates.128 In awarding emotional distress damages when the body of 
 
125 By including damages for the “reasonably expected society, companionship, love and affection for the pet,” 
see TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(d) (Supp. 2005), the Tennessee statute seems to recognize that humans can form 
such meaningful relationships with their companion animals, which is not the type of recognition one would expect 
for “relationships” with inanimate property.  On the other hand, by explicitly using the term “owner” (“‘pet’ means 
any domesticated dog or cat normally maintained in or near the household of its owner.”  TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-
17-403(b) (Supp. 2005)), the statute appears to implicitly recognize the status of pets as property. 
126 The only possible exception is the Brousseau case, where, by including loss of companionship as an element 
of damages, the New York court seemed to be saying something about the animal’s status that put it in a different 
category from inanimate property.  443 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980). 
127 415 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979). 
128 A Westlaw Key Cite search of Corso yields sixty-nine citing references, including several cases in New 
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plaintiff’s fifteen-year-old poodle was mishandled after its death, the court created a special legal 
status for companion animals: 
[T]he court must first decide whether a pet such as a dog is only an item of personal 
property as prior cases have held.  This court now overrules prior precedent and holds 
that a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person 
and a piece of personal property.129 
The court thus awarded damages for the plaintiff’s mental anguish above the market value of the 
dog.  In doing so, it made a special point to narrow its decision to the loss of animals, specifically 
distinguishing the loss of inanimate property: 
This decision is not to be construed to include an award for the loss of a family 
heirloom which would also cause great mental anguish.  An heirloom while it 
might be the source of good feelings is merely an inanimate object and is not 
capable of returning love and affection.  It does not respond to human stimulation; 
it has no brain capable of displaying emotion which in turn causes a human 
response.  Losing the right to memorialize a pet rock, or a pet tree or losing a 
family picture album is not actionable.  But a dog – that is something else.  To say 
it is a piece of personal property and no more is a repudiation of our humaneness.  
This I cannot accept.130 
Despite this case’s strong language, clear message, the effect of that message on the 
outcome of the case, and all the other courts and commentators who have cited it, Corso actually 
has very little precedential value.  Its holding has not been followed by subsequent New York 
cases.  Several recent cases have simply ignored the Corso “holding” and have instead asserted 
that New York law recognizes pets as personal property,131 and because pets are personal 
property, plaintiffs cannot recover emotional distress damages for their loss.132 And a federal 
 
York and other jurisdictions, numerous secondary sources, and a half dozen appellate petitions. 
129 Corso, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 183 (citation omitted).  This is the language that has been cited so often by other 
courts. 
130 Id.
131 See Lewis v. Di Donna, 743 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
132 Mercurio v. Weber, 2003 WL 21497325 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2003).  This case further repudiates the Corso 
holding by finding that, “[i]f plaintiff could recover for the emotional distress of losing her dog, such logic could be 
extended to allow recovery for emotional distress caused by the destruction of other sentimental items like family 
heirlooms, class rings or old pictures.”  Id. at *1.  See also Jason v. Parks, 638 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996) (“It is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for the negligent destruction of 
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court, deciding a case under New York law, described Corso’s holding that a pet was more than 
property as an “aberration[] flying in the face of overwhelming authority to the contrary.”133 The 
federal district court criticized the Corso opinion for providing “no legal reasoning why prior 
precedent should be overruled in categorizing pets as more than property.”134 Thus the Corso 
language, despite its appeal to many, essentially sits on the books as a lower court opinion with 
little actual clout. 
Similarly strong language can be seen in a Wisconsin case, where the plaintiff sought 
damages for emotional distress when a police officer fatally shot her dog:  
At the outset, we note that we are uncomfortable with the law’s cold 
characterization of a dog . . . as mere “property.”  Labeling a dog “property” fails 
to describe the value human beings place upon the companionship that they enjoy 
with a dog. A companion dog is not a fungible item, equivalent to other items of 
personal property.  A companion dog is not a living room sofa or dining room 
furniture.  This term inadequately and inaccurately describes the relationship 
between a human and a dog.135 
While this language has also been cited and quoted by other courts and commentators,136 it 
remains dicta; what the court said actually had no effect on the outcome of the case.  Despite the 
concern it expressed with the above language, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not see itself in 
a position to change “established legal doctrine” and thus refused to award emotional distress 
damages for loss of a dog.137 
a dog.”); Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (“[T]he court is not about to recognize a 
tortious cause of action to recover for emotional distress due to the death of a family pet”). 
133 Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
134 Id.
135 Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001) (footnotes omitted). 
136 See, e.g., Harabes v. The Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001). 
As recognized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, “[l]abeling a dog  ‘property’ fails to describe 
the value human beings place upon the companionship that they enjoy with a dog . . . A 
companion dog is not a living room sofa or dining room furniture.  This term inadequately and 
inaccurately describes the relationship between a human and a dog.”  Nevertheless, there is no 
authority in this state for allowing plaintiffs to recover non-economic damages resulting from 
defendants’ alleged negligence. 
Id. at 1146 (citation omitted). 
137 Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d at 798.  A very similar result, as well as very similar language can found in a 2004 
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Judge Andell’s concurring opinion in a Texas Court of Appeals case concerning damages 
for a hunter’s negligent killing of plaintiff’s dogs expresses a similar sentiment: 
Society has long since moved beyond the untenable Cartesian view that animals 
are unfeeling automatons and, hence, mere property.  The law should reflect 
society’s recognition that animals are sentient and emotive beings that are capable 
of providing companionship to the humans with whom they live. . . . 
Losing a beloved pet is not the same as losing an inanimate object, however 
cherished it may be.  Even an heirloom of great sentimental value, if lost, does not 
constitute a loss comparable to that of a living being.138 
Andell chose to write separately from the majority in order “to address what I consider to be a 
more substantial basis for affirming this award, namely, the intrinsic or special value of domestic 
animals as companions and beloved pets.”139 
All three of these cases express, in strong language, important and meaningful differences 
between animals and inanimate property.  Yet they represent little, if any, actual changes in the 
law.  One is a lower court opinion that has not been followed, even in its own jurisdiction, 
another is mere dicta, and the third is language in a concurrence.  But despite the minimal 
precedential weight of these cases, the language used in these opinions reflects, at a minimum, an 
increasing discomfort that some judges have had with the legal status quo – it is clear that this is 
an area where the established law is in conflict with the reality of how many people view 
companion animals.140 
Connecticut case, where the appellate court found that a plaintiff whose dog was removed and euthanized by animal 
control officers had failed to state a claim because the common law did not recognize emotional distress claims for 
“injury to such property as a pet.”  The court’s language sounds very much like that in the Rabideau case:  
Labeling a pet as property fails to describe the emotional value human beings place on the companionship 
that they enjoy with such an animal.  Although dogs are considered property; see General Statutes § 22-
350; this term inadequately and inaccurately describes the relationship between an individual and his or her 
pet.  That having been said, there is no common-law authority in this state that allows plaintiffs to recover 
noneconomic damages resulting from a defendant’s alleged negligent or intentional act resulting in the 
death of a pet . . . . 
Myers v. City of Hartford, 853 A.2d 621, 626 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). 
138 Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377-78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (Andell, J. concurring). 
139 Id. at 373. 
140 See infra notes 265-266 and accompanying text, discussing the numerous ways in which behavior towards 
pets demonstrates the extent to which our society has come to value companion animals. 
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B.  Court Decisions and Legislative Enactments that Recognize a Change in the Legal 
Status of Companion Animals   
 
If valuation of damages for lost or injured animals were the only legal area affected, it 
might be less important to change an animal’s status.  But courts are also called upon to resolve 
disputes between losers and finders of pet animals, resolve other animal custody disputes, and 
deal with provisions of wills that request that the animals be destroyed upon the owner’s death.  
And state legislatures are acting in ways that recognize a change in the status of animals by 
creating legislation that allows for enforceable trusts to ensure animals’ care after the owner dies 
and by increasing penalties under their animal cruelty statutes. 
1. Lost & Found Animal Disputes
Many lost animals end up at local shelters.  Shelters have specific roles in caring for lost 
animals and finding new homes for them.  As a result, specific laws have developed regulating 
shelters.  State statutes regulate how long a shelter must keep a found animal before adopting it 
out to another family;141 whether there needs to be any holding period at all when an owner 
surrenders an animal to a shelter; and what efforts, if any, the shelter must make to find the 
animal’s original owner.142 If the shelter complies with the statutory requirements, courts do not 
interfere with their decision to adopt out an animal.143 Courts have also declined to require 
shelters to disclose the identity of the animal’s new owner when the original owner requests this 
 
141 In addition to the shelter holding periods mandated by state statutes, the Federal Pet Theft Act (a part of the 
Animal Welfare Act) requires that shelters hold pets for at least five days before selling them to a dealer, a provision 
that was enacted to minimize the risks of stolen pets being sold for research.  See 7 U.S.C. § 2158 (2000). 
142 See generally Patricia A. Bolen, Lost and Found: Humane Societies’ Rights and Obligations Regarding 
Companion Animal Ownership, ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CENTER (2005), 
http://www.animallaw.info/articles/dduspetadoption.htm.
143 Id. See also Rebecca J. Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning Issues Relating to Companion 
Animals, 74 U. COLO. L. REV 181, 216 (2003) (“The clear trend among appellate cases is that once an adoption has 
been made through a recognized humane society, especially if the society followed the standards set forth under 
relevant law, the adoption will be upheld.”) 
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information from the shelter that adopted the animal out.144 
But disputes sometimes develop when someone loses a companion animal and a private 
person takes in that animal – bypassing the shelter system and the laws that apply in that context.  
One such case was Morgan v. Kroupa,145 where the Vermont Supreme court recognized that a 
pet dog’s status is different from that of property. 
In July 1994, Mary Morgan found a dog that had been lost by Zane Kroupa.146 Morgan 
made several efforts to locate the dog’s owner: reporting to the local humane society, posting 
notices in area parks and stores, and arranging for announcements on a local radio station.147 
When these efforts to locate the dog’s owner failed, she took the dog in, took care of it, and 
“considered it the household pet.”148 More than a year later, Kroupa, who lived two miles from 
Morgan, discovered where the dog was and sought to have it returned.149 He drove to Morgan’s 
house and left with the dog.  Morgan brought an action to recover the dog.150 
In affirming trial court’s decision to award possession of dog to Morgan, the Vermont 
Supreme Court declined to apply Vermont’s lost property statute, despite language in the statute 
covering “stray beasts.”151 The court determined that this language was not intended to apply to 
lost pets, but rather “agricultural animals of substantial monetary value.”152 The court declined 
 
144 See John J. Tiemessen & Jason A. Weiner, Commentary, The Golden Retriever Rule: Alaska’s Identity 
Privilege for Animal Adoption Agencies and for Adoptive Animal Owners, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 77 (2004). 
145 702 A.2d 630 (Vt. 1997). 
146 Id. at 631. 
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 The court noted:  
Vermont’s lost property statute provides that a person who “finds money or goods, to the value of 
$3.00 or more, or takes up a stray beast, the owner of which is not known, shall, within six days 
thereafter, make two notices, describing such money, goods or beast, with the natural or artificial 
marks, with the time and place of finding or taking up the same, and post them in two public 
places in town in which such property was found.” 
Id. at 632, citing 27 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1101. 
152 Id. 
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to apply the lost property statute to a lost pet because, “pets generally do not fit neatly within 
traditional property law principles.”153 In reaching its decision, the court’s language recognized 
that pets belong in a different category from other forms of property: “Like most pets, [the dog’s] 
worth is not primarily financial, but emotional; its value derives from the animal’s relationship 
with its human companions.”154 
Instead of applying the lost property statute to this dispute, the court decided to fashion 
new rules that would recognize “the substantial value that society places on domestic 
animals.”155 The court further determined that it would be against the public interest not to 
provide incentives for finders of lost animals to take in, care for and develop relationships with 
them.156 The result in this case was that Morgan, who found the dog and cared for it for over a 
year, was awarded possession of the dog.157 
An interesting aspect to this case was the approach taken by the trial court.  While the 
lower court opted to treat the case as a simple property case and apply Vermont’s lost property 
statute (a result which was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court), it acknowledged that the 
case might be approached under a number other legal theories, including weighing the 
“emotional attachment” of the two parties, and notably, “inquiring into what was in the ‘best 
interests’ of the dog,” similar to the approach taken in child custody cases.158 While neither the 
trial court nor the appellate court opted to take this last approach, both courts at least entertained 
the possibility. 
While the Morgan court’s approach clearly places companion animals in a different 
 
153 Id. at 633.  The court went on to cite language from Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 
182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979): “[A] pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a 
person and a piece of personal property.” 
154 Morgan, 702 A.2d at 633. 
155 Id. 
156 Id.
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 631. 
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category from other property (including, notably, other animal property), this approach is not one 
that has yet been embraced by other courts, either in process or in result.159 Nevertheless, the 
case provides an important example of how traditional property concepts provide an inadequate 
framework for decisions involving the custody of lost and found pets, and a useful jumping-off 
point for proposals on how such disputes might be addressed in the future.  One commentator, 
for, example, has proposed that a balancing test be used to the weigh interests of the pet’s 
original owners with those of the person who found the pet and subsequently bonded with it.160 
2. Pet Custody Cases  
Several courts have, in fact, applied a “best interest” standard in resolving custody 
disputes over companion animals.  And while this approach appears to represent a minority 
position161 at this time, it indicates another important inroad into the legal system’s view of 
companion animals as something distinct from inanimate property.162 In one New York case, for 
example, the court used the best interest standard of child custody cases to determine that it was 
in the best interests of an elderly cat to remain at the home where he has “lived, prospered, loved 
and been loved for the past four years.”163 In another, there was dispute over a cat’s legal 
custody after two unrelated roommates separated.164 In awarding custody to one of the 
 
159 See, e.g., Williams v. McMahan, No. 26983-0-II, 2002 WL 242538 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2002) 
(applying property principles, the trial court ordered a dog returned to its original owner after the person who found 
the dog had kept and cared for the dog for nine months). 
160 See Huss, supra note 143, at 218-19. 
161 See id. at 221 (“Usually, animals are treated in property settlements as just another form of personal property 
and assigned a monetary value.”).  See also id. at 225, discussing Nuzzaci v. Nuzzaci, No. CN194-10771, 1995 WL 
783006 (Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 19, 1995), where a Delaware court “declined to apply the best interests of the animal 
approach.” 
162 See Barbara Newell, Animal Custody Disputes: A Growing Crack in the ‘Legal Thinghood’ of Nonhuman 
Animals, 6 ANIMAL L. 179 (2000). 
163 Raymond v. Lachmann, 695 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
164 See Brooke A. Masters, In Courtroom Tug of War Over Custody, Roommate Wins the Kitty, WASH. POST,
Sept. 13, 1997, at B1 (describing Arlington, Virginia’s Judge Kendrick’s resolution of the struggle between Andrew 
Zovko and Kovar Gregory over the possession of their cat, Grady). 
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roommates, the judge took into account what was in the best interest of the cat.165 
Cases using a “best interest” standard to determine pet custody have generated a fair bit 
of coverage in the popular media,166 not all of it positive, but the idea is becoming more and 
more mainstream.  One legal commentator, for example, has recently proposed the development 
of statutory provisions to determine pet custody using a “best interests of the animal” approach 
and modeling the provisions on child custody statutes.167 Such an approach makes good sense 
given the ways in which many human families regard their pets as part of the family and how 
most people regard their pets in ways very different from the way they regard their inanimate 
property. 
3. Estates and Trusts
Estate Planning and Administration is another area of law that demonstrates important 
differences in the ways both courts and legislatures are treating animate versus inanimate 
property.  There are a number of examples of judicial decisions where clauses in wills that 
instruct that pets be destroyed are voided as “against public policy.”  A more recent, and perhaps 
much more far-reaching development is the adoption of legislation in a number of jurisdictions 
that allows for the creation of binding pet trusts that are set up to insure that a companion animal 
is well cared for after its owner’s death. 
a.  Judicial Decisions Voiding Clauses Instructing That Animals Be Destroyed 
 
165 See Newell, supra note 162, at 180 (“According to the Washington Post, “for [Judge] Kendrick, Grady’s 
happiness took priority . . . .  Kendrick said he would decide ‘what is in the best interest of Grady . . . .’” (quoting 
Masters, supra note 164). 
166 See, e.g., Angelica Martinez, Kitty Custody – What Happens to Pets When Owners Separate, CAT FANCY,
Apr. 2004, at 34.  This article explains that because people are treating their companion animals like family 
members, and often like children, pet custody battles are becoming more prevalent in divorce cases.  To decide these 
cases, some courts are using the best interest standard to decide which person should receive custody, much like 
they do in child custody cases.  Additionally, judges are asking to hear arguments on who is the better “parent” to 
the animal. In some cases, parties are using experts, pet therapists, and specialist to make these arguments.  Couples 
have been granted joint custody, and the court can award visitation rights and financial support – a process which 
has been dubbed, “petimony.” 
167 See Huss, supra note 143, at 227-29. 
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The Estate of Howard Brand168 is a frequently cited example of a court’s willingness to 
void a testamentary clause calling for the destruction of animals.  Perhaps this case is so often 
cited because it so well exemplifies the difference between animals and inanimate property, both 
in the public reaction to clauses calling for destruction and in the legal remedies that courts are 
willing to fashion.  Brand’s will included a provision that, upon his death, his Cadillac be 
crushed and his horses be destroyed.169 When the provisions of his will became known, there 
was very little concern expressed about crushing the car,170 but a great deal of public outcry 
about the fate of horses.  A neighbor of Brands’ sought a way to contest his will, and the story 
was reported in a local newspaper, which eventually led to the formation of “The Coalition to 
Save Brand’s Horses.”171 The group, which included organizations such as the Vermont 
Humane Federation and the Student Animal Legal Defense Fund of the Vermont Law School, 
filed a motion for Preliminary Injunction and a Motion to Intervene.172 Numerous people 
contacted the coalition offering to adopt the horses if their lives were spared.173 
While Brand’s attorney argued that the will provision was legal, represented his client’s 
final wishes, and should therefore be upheld,174 the court sided with the coalition and refused to 
 
168 Abigail J. Sykas, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Can the Public Policy Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of 
Property by Testamentary Direction?, 25 VT. L. REV. 911, 934 (2001) (citing In re Brand’s Estate, No. 28473 (Vt. 
Chittenden Cty. Prob. Ct. Mar. 17, 1999)). 
169 Id. “The court acknowledged the fact that Mr. Brand was attempting to thwart any possibility that the 
animals would be mistreated after his death.”  Id. at 934 n.217. 
170 “While the court received more than fifty letters regarding the outcome of this case, none of them addressed 
the destruction of a perfectly good Cadillac.”  Suzette Daniels, An Introduction to Pet in Wills and Pet Euthanasia,
ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CENTER (2004), http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arusdanielssuzette2004.htm
(citing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, In re Estate of Howard H. Brand, (Mar. 17, 1999) available 
at http://www.animallaw.info/pleadings/pb_pdf/pbusvtbrandorder.pdf). 
171 See Daniels, supra note 170 (citing Pamela Loring, Horses Await Brand New Life after Rescue From a 
Willed Death, HORSIN’ AROUND, 1999). 
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Mar. 4, 1999, available at 
http://www.animallaw.info/pleadings/pb_pdf/pbusvtbrandmemoopp.pdf.
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allow the horses to be killed.175 Instead, it voided the provision stipulating their destruction as 
against public policy.176 While acknowledging that the testator’s intentions were to prevent the 
animals from suffering after his death by having them humanely euthanized, the court applied 
the doctrine of cy pres, and found that the horses could better be saved from inhumane treatment 
by saving their lives and letting them be taken in by someone else willing to care for them.177 
Similar results were seen in several other American cases and one Canadian case.  In In 
re Capers Estate,178 a Pennsylvania court found that a willed instruction to destroy two Irish 
Setters179 was void “as not being within the purview of the Wills Act of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania” and also as being against the public policy of the commonwealth.180 Instead of 
following the testator’s instructions that the animals be killed, the court gave the dogs to the 
couple who had been caring for them since her death.181 A California court similarly voided a 
testator’s instruction, through a provision in her will, to destroy her pet dog, Sido.182 The court 
found that the provision violated public policy and was potentially illegal under California law 
(because of specific provisions authorizing conditions under which dogs may be euthanized).183 
The court fashioned a remedy where the dog passed under the will’s residuary clause to an 
organization called Pets Unlimited, which allowed Sido to stay in its custodial home, subject to 
 
175 See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Mar. 17, 1999, available at 
http://www.animallaw.info/pleadings/pb_pdf/pbusvtbrandorder.pdf. See also Sykas, supra note 168, at 934. 
176 Sykas, supra note 168, at 934. 
177 See id.
178 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121 (C.P. Allegheny County 1964). 
179 A clause in Ida Capers’ will instructed: “I direct that any dog which I may own at the time of my death be 
destroyed in a humane manner and I give and grant unto my Executors hereinafter named full and complete power 
and discretion necessary to carry out the same.” In re Capers Estate, 34 Pa. D. &. C.2d at 122. 
180 In re Capers’ Estate, 34 Pa. D. &. C.2d at 141; see also Harold W. Hannah, Wills Requiring the Destruction 
of Pets—the Veterinarian’s Position, 199 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N 1156, 1158 (1991). 
181 In re Capers’ Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d at 141. 
182 See Sykas, supra note 168, citing Rep. Tr. at 6, Smith v. Avanzino, No. 225-698 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F. City 
& County, June 17, 1980). 
183 Id.
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inspection by the court.184 
A Canadian court voided a similar clause in the will of Clive Wishart, who directed that 
after his death his four horses, Barney, Bill, Jack, and King, be “shot by the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police and then buried.”185 The RCMP refused to carry out this instruction without a 
court order, and the court ultimately declined to give such an order.186 Like the Brand case, there 
was a great deal of public outcry against the destruction of the horses, both in the United States 
and Canada.187 In refusing to carry out Wishart’s instructions, the court found the provision to 
be void as contrary to public policy.188 It also found that the testator’s wishes, which it 
determined to be preventing the mistreatment of the horses after his death, could better be 
effected by directing the New Brunswick SPCA to find a new home for the horses.189 
This last point highlights some of the potential difficulties with cases where courts find 
clauses directing animals’ destruction upon the testator’s death void as against public policy.  If 
the court truly is aiming to find a better way to effect the testator’s intent that the animals not 
suffer after his death, it is not clear how far courts are actually willing to go to see that the 
animals are in fact properly cared for – for the remainder of their lives.190 In its efforts to address 
 
184 Id. The court made its decision despite being notified that the issue was moot because of legislative action.  
“California S. Bill 2059, which included a provision to save Sido specifically, had been unanimously passed and 
signed into law before the close of court proceedings.”  Waisman & Newell, supra note 39, at 57 n.52. 
185 In re Wishart, [1992] 129 N.B.R.2d 397. 
186 Id. See also Daniels, supra note 170. 
187 See Wishart, 129 N.B.R. at 402 (discussing the public reaction to the clause of the will); Daniels, supra note 
170. 
188 “It is my conclusion that to destroy Barney, Bill, Jack and King as directed in the Will at this time and in the 
present circumstances would be contrary to public policy.  The direction in the will is therefore void.”  Wishart, 129 
N.B.R.2d at 420. 
189 See Wishart, 129 N.B.R. at 406. 
190 This was a point that arose with some emphasis in a discussion of these cases with a group of veterinarians at 
Intern-Resident Rounds at the University of Pennsylvania Veterinary School on May 17, 2005.  A number of the 
veterinarians present expressed concern at the courts’ intervention and argued that courts should only prevent such 
killings if they are prepared to insure the animals’ proper care for the rest of their lives.  A similar sentiment can be 
seen in the opposition of the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) to the American Horse Slaughter 
Prevention Act (AHSPA), a proposed federal bill that would prohibit the selling of horses for slaughter.  While one 
might expect the AVMA to support such a bill, they explain their opposition in the following way: “The AVMA and 
AAEP recognize that the processing of unwanted horses is currently a necessary aspect of the equine industry, and 
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these concerns, the Canadian court set out the following conditions for the disposition of the 
horses: 
(1) Prior inspection and approval by the New Brunswick S.P.C.A.; 
 
(2) A written agreement between the Estate and the New Brunswick S.P.C.A. and 
the new owner or owners that he, she or it will cooperate with the New Brunswick 
S.P.C.A. after acquiring ownership, which agreement will include:  
 
(a) Permission for regular inspection of the horses . . . ;  
(b) An undertaking to provide and pay for veterinary services . . . ;  
(c) An undertaking to properly feed and care for the horse or horses in 
accord with accepted practices and not to abuse the horse or horses;  
(d) Such other reasonable conditions as the parties may agree upon and the 
Court approve to ensure that the horses are not abused . . . .191 
By setting out these conditions, the Wishart court recognizes that in order to properly 
carry out the testator’s intent, the horses must be taken care of properly for the remainder of their 
lives.  It is not clear, however, to what extent the Brand court took the rest of the horses’ lives 
into account in deciding who would care for them after it voided the testator’s instruction to have 
them humanely euthanized.  No such concerns arise, of course, in the disposition of inanimate 
property upon a testator’s death, further highlighting distinctions between these different types of 
“property.” 
If the courts in these cases were right, and the testators’ true intent was to prevent 
mistreatment of their animals, then testators (and, arguably, their animals) are better served if 
they can make these choices directly.  For many years, there was no way to enforce a will 
 
provides a humane alternative to allowing the horse to continue a life of discomfort and pain, and possibly 
inadequate care or abandonment.”  See American Veterinary Medical Ass’n, AVMA Legislative Alerts and Updates, 
http://www.capwiz.com/avma/issues/alert/?alertid=7130716&type=CO (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).  The 
organization further states that it will not support the legislation unless it adequately addresses the issue of animal 
welfare: 
The AHSPA does not address the welfare of horses that will not be slaughtered.  Many of these 
unwanted horses will be donated to horse rescue and retirement facilities, which are not regulated 
by any governmental body.  While many of these facilities are well run, regulations must be put in 
place to establish standards of care to ensure the humane care of these unwanted horses. 
Id. 
191 Wishart, 129 N.B.R.2d at 421-22. 
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provision to assure that an animal was properly cared for after its owner’s death.  In recent years, 
however, a better way of assuring an animal’s care after its owner’s death has come about, a 
legislative solution that allows for the creation of binding trusts to insure an animal’s proper care. 
b.  Legislation creating binding pet trusts. 
For many years, people who wished to provide for their animals after their death had no 
way of insuring that such provisions would be carried out.  Property could not be left directly to 
an animal, and attempts to create trusts to benefit an animal could not be guaranteed success.  In 
an historical section of his 2000 article, Pet Animals: What Happens When Their Owners Die, 
Gerry Beyer sets out the numerous ways “courts have frustrated an owner’s intent to provide 
long-term care for the pet after the owner’s death.”192 These include findings that gifts to care 
for specific animals were not charitable, and therefore not enforceable;193 finding that such gifts 
violated the rule against perpetuities (because an animal’s life could not count as the “measuring 
life” to satisfy the Rule’s requirement that the gift vest no later than twenty-one years after the 
death of a measuring life);194 finding the amount of money left to care for the animals to be 
excessive and therefore reducing those amounts;195 and finding that a testator failed to select a 
proper legal mechanism to transfer the funds for the animal’s care.196 
Testators’ wishes to care for their pets had a better chance of being realized once courts 
began recognizing and permitting honorary trusts to provide for pets.197 However, because these 
trusts were honorary, and therefore not enforceable, there was no way of guaranteeing that their 
provisions would actually be carried out.  “Since these trustees were permitted to exercise an 
 
192 Gerry W. Beyer, Pet Animals: What Happens When Their Owners Die, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV 617, 629 
(2000). 
193 Id. at 631. 
194 Id. at 631-32. 
195 Id. at 633. 
196 Id. at 633-34. 
197 See id. at 635-39 (discussing the creative ways in which courts have upheld honorary pet trusts and have 
construed them so they would not be in violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities). 
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enormous amount of discretion, the recipient pets were completely at their mercy.  The courts 
did not step in to enforce the provisions and ensure that trustee was properly caring for the 
animals.”198 
Recent statutory changes have removed this uncertainty in many jurisdictions.  While a 
few statutes that allow the creation trusts for the care of pets still only recognize honorary 
trusts,199 many other state laws recognize enforceable pet trusts.  Such recognition initially came 
with the adoption of Section 2-907 of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which provides for the 
enforcement of a pet trust by “an individual designated for that purpose in the trust instrument or, 
if none, by an individual appointed by a court upon application to it by an individual.”200 In 
 
198 Daniels, supra note 170. 
199 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15212 (West Supp. 2005) (“A trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet 
animal may be performed by the trustee for the life of the animal, whether or not there is a beneficiary who can seek 
enforcement or termination of the trust and whether or not the terms of the trust contemplate a longer duration.”); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.11 (West 2002) (“where the owner of property makes a testamentary transfer in trust for a 
specific noncharitable purpose, and there is no definite or definitely ascertainable human beneficiary designated, no 
enforceable trust is created; but the transferee has power to apply the property to the designated purpose, unless the 
purpose is capricious.”).  But see discussion at Estate Planning for Pets Foundation, Legal Primer: The Law of 
Trusts for the Care of Pets (Oct. 1, 2004), http://www.estateplanningforpets.com/: “However, the current trend in 
recent state laws has veered away from this approach, as two states (Missouri and Tennessee) that had originally 
enacted honorary trust statutes have recently enacted versions of the UTC §408.” 
200 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§ 2-907(c)(4) (2001).  The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws initially promulgated the UPC in 1969 and last amended § 2-907 in 1993.  Other relevant portions of § 2-
907 read as follows: 
(b) [Trust for Pets.]  Subject to this subsection and subsection (c), a trust for the care of a 
designated domestic or pet animal is valid.  The trust terminates when no living animal is covered 
by the trust.  A governing instrument must be liberally construed to bring the transfer within this 
subsection, to presume against the merely precatory or honorary nature of the disposition, and to 
carry out the general intent of the transferor. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in determining the 
transferor’s intent. 
(c) [Additional Provisions Applicable to Honorary Trusts and Trusts for Pets.]  In addition to 
the provisions of subsection (a) or (b), a trust covered by either of those subsections is subject to 
the following provisions: 
 (1) Except as expressly provided otherwise in the trust instrument, no portion of the principal 
or income may be converted to the use of the trustee or to any use other than for the trust’s 
purposes or for the benefit of a covered animal.  
 (2) Upon termination, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended trust property in the 
following order:  
 (i) as directed in the trust instrument;  
 (ii) if the trust was created in a nonresiduary clause in the transferor’s will or in a codicil to 
the transferor’s will, under the residuary clause in the transferor’s will; and  
 (iii) if no taker is produced by the application of subparagraph (i) or (ii), to the transferor’s 
heirs under Section 2-711.  
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adding this section, the drafters recognized the “concern of many pet owners by providing them a 
means for leaving funds to be used for the pet’s care.”201 There is a similar provision in section 
408 of the Uniform Trust Code: a pet trust may be enforced by “a person appointed in the terms 
of the trust or, if no person is so appointed, by a person appointed by the court.”202 The 
comments to this section go on to clarify its meaning: 
Section 110(b) grants to the person appointed the rights of a qualified beneficiary 
for the purpose of receiving notices and providing consents.  If the trust is created 
for the care of an animal, a person with an interest in the welfare of the animal has 
standing to petition for an appointment.  The person appointed by the court to 
enforce the trust should also be a person who has exhibited an interest in the 
animal’s welfare.  The concept of granting standing to a person with a 
demonstrated interest in the animal’s welfare is derived from the Uniform 
 
(3) For the purposes of Section 2-707, the residuary clause is treated as creating a future 
interest under the terms of a trust.  
 (4) The intended use of the principal or income can be enforced by an individual designated 
for that purpose in the trust instrument or, if none, by an individual appointed by a court upon 
application to it by an individual.  
 (5) Except as ordered by the court or required by the trust instrument, no filing, report, 
registration, periodic accounting, separate maintenance of funds, appointment, or fee is required 
by reason of the existence of the fiduciary relationship of the trustee.  
 (6) A court may reduce the amount of the property transferred, if it determines that that 
amount substantially exceeds the amount required for the intended use.  The amount of the 
reduction, if any, passes as unexpended trust property under subsection (c)(2).  
 (7) If no trustee is designated or no designated trustee is willing or able to serve, a court shall 
name a trustee.  A court may order the transfer of the property to another trustee, if required to 
assure that the intended use is carried out and if no successor trustee is designated in the trust 
instrument or if no designated successor trustee agrees to serve or is able to serve.  A court may 
also make such other orders and determinations as shall be advisable to carry out the intent of the 
transferor and the purpose of this section.]  
Id. § 2-907. 
201 U.P.C. § 2-907 cmt. 
202 U.T.C. § 408(b) (2003), as originally promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 2000 and last amended in 2003.  See U.T.C. § 408. Trust For Care Of Animal: 
(a) A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor’s 
lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide 
for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor’s lifetime, upon the death of the last 
surviving animal. 
(b) A trust authorized by this section may be enforced by a person appointed in the terms of 
the trust or, if no person is so appointed, by a person appointed by the court. A person having an 
interest in the welfare of the animal may request the court to appoint a person to enforce the trust 
or to remove a person appointed. 
(c) Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its intended use, 
except to the extent the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the amount 
required for the intended use. Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, property not 
required for the intended use must be distributed to the settlor, if then living, otherwise to the 
settlor’s successors in interest. 
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Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, which allows a person interested in 
the welfare of a ward or protected person to file petitions on behalf of the ward or 
protected person.203 
The parallels that this comment draws between persons interested in the welfare of a 
human ward and persons interested in an animal’s welfare make clear that this law treats animals 
very differently from inanimate property.   In fact, this provision comes closer than any currently 
codified law to giving the animals it covers a status that is similar to that of persons.  These laws 
that create binding pet trusts have thus gone a long way toward recognizing a new status for 
companion animals. 
A total of twenty-six states now have statutes that authorize the creation of binding pet 
trusts.204 Nine of these states have chosen to enact Section 2-907 of the Uniform Probate 
Code;205 ten states have adopted a version of the more recent Uniform Trust Code (UTC) 
§408;206 and seven others that have not adopted either of the uniform codes have opted to enforce 
pet trusts through independent statutes.207 
In addition to these increased legal protections, there are numerous resources to help pet 
owners provide for their animals care after their death.  One organization, The Estate Planning 
for Pets Foundation, offers a website containing “information resources for conscientious pet 
 
203 U.T.C. § 408 cmt. 
204 See Statutory Pet Trusts, http://www.estateplanningforpets.com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2006). 
205 ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.907 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2907 (1995), COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-
901 (West 2005); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15.2 (West Supp. 2005), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2722 
(West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-1017 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-147 (2003); TEXAS PROPERTY CODE § 
112,037(Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1001 (Supp. 2005). 
206 States using UTC § 408: Ark. Code Ann. § 28-73-408 (Supp. 2005); D.C. CODE § 19-1304.08 (Supp. 2005); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-408 (Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 408 (Supp. 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. §
456.4-408 (West Supp. 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3834 (Supp. 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.0075 
(LexisNexis 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-408 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. §46A-4-408 
(LexisNexis 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-408 (Supp. 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-409 (2005). 
207 States with independent versions of pet trusts: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 737.116 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. §
633.2105 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:11-38 (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-8.1 
(McKinney Supp. 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 128.308 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.118 (West Supp. 2005).  
In addition, ID. CODE § 15-7-601 adopts a “Purpose Trust,” which appears to include pet trusts. 
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owners and professionals who assist them.”208 The site offers a range of resources, including 
links “for pet owners,” “for lawyers,” and “for skeptics,” a legal primer, sample language for pet 
trusts, links to the relevant statutes in each state, information on tax considerations, and methods 
for calculating funds needed for caretaking.209 Another, Pet Guardian, offers its “PetGuardian 
plan,” which provides a pet trust document, a cost analysis to help determine how much to set 
aside for pets, a set of sample pet care instructions, and emergency identification cards to be 
posted at home and kept in wallets.210 In addition, this organization has teamed up with Best 
Friends, a large animal sanctuary in Kanab, Utah to provide what they call “The Best Friends 
“backup” service,” which helps to locate alternate caregivers in cases where the originally 
designated caregivers become unavailable.211 
Similar resources are now being offered by a number of veterinary schools.  The School 
of Veterinary Medicine at U.C. Davis recently began offering a program called “Tender Loving 
Care for Pets” through its Center for Animal in Society.212 This program gives animal owners—
through a bequest to the vet school—assurance that their pet will be placed in a “permanent 
loving home” and will receive life-time health care at the school’s veterinary hospital if the 
owner predeceases her pet.213 The program promises to “identify and monitor new homes for 
enrolled pets.”214 The Veterinary School at Texas A&M University goes even further, providing 
an on-campus “Companion Animal Life-Care Center” which “provides the physical, emotional, 
 
208 Estate Planning for Pets Foundation, Estate Planning for Your Pet, http://www.estateplanningforpets.com/
(last visited Sept. 23, 2005). 
209 See id. site map. 
210 See Pet Guardian, About Our Service: Introducing the PetGuardian Pet Trust Program, 
http://www.petguardian.com/common.php?v_section=2&v_page=2 (last visited Mar. 2, 2006). 
211 (“If you have designated two potential caregivers and set aside appropriate funds, Best Friends will help 
locate an alternate caregiver should anything happen to the initial tow designated caregivers.”) See id.
212 See Heather Bloch, Teaching Skill and Compassion, 32 BARK 53, 56 (2005). 
213 See Center for Animals in Society, Tender Loving Care for Pets (TLC), 
http://www.vetmed.ucdavis.edu/Animals%5Fin%5FSociety/tlc/default.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2006). 
214Id. 
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and medical needs of companion animals whose owners are no longer able to provide that 
care.”215 According to the center’s web site, its clients include those who predecease their pet.216 
In addition to its full-time staff, the center houses veterinary students who “live on site to ensure 
24 hour care and company for our residents.”217 Resources such as these make clear the 
perceived need to help pet owners provide for their pets’ care after their death.  The proliferation 
of not only the laws providing for binding pet trusts, but these resources that take advantage of 
those laws, makes clear just how large that need may be. 
4. Increased Penalties and Protections in Animal Cruelty Statutes
Criminal laws prohibiting cruelty to animals—which includes both abuse and neglect—
have provided the primary way in which our legal system has protected animals.218 These 
enactments highlight one of the few ways in which the law has traditionally treated animals 
differently from other forms of property, and perhaps has not treated them as “property” at all.  
State anti-cruelty statutes, by some accounts, are older than our country219 and date back at least 
as far as the time of the civil war.220 At the federal level, animal protection law is more recent.  
The Animal Welfare Act was enacted in 1966, and it has been amended several times since then 
to strengthen some of the protections of the animals that it covers.221 
The Animal Welfare Act is fairly limited in scope.  The law aims to insure the humane 
 
215See Texas A&M University, Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care Center, The Center, 
http://www.cvm.tamu.edu/petcare/center.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2006). 
216 Id. 
217 See Texas A&M University, Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care Center, Staff, 
http://www.cvm.tamu.edu/petcare/staff.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2006). 
218 See Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Animal Anti-Cruelty Statutes: An Overview, 5 ANIMAL L. 69, 69 (1999). 
219 Several sources cite as the first American anti-cruelty statute a 1641 law enacted by the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony, which stated that “No man shall exercise any Tirranny or Crueltie towards any Bruite creature which are 
usuallie kept for man’s use.”  See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 34, at 252; Animal Protection Institute, State Animal 
Cruelty Laws (Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.api4animals.org/47.htm.
220 See supra note 33. 
221 Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131-2156 (2000) (amended in 1970, 1976, 1985 and 1990). 
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treatment of animals used in research, for exhibition purposes, or as pets.222 But its regulation on 
research only applies to certain warm-blooded animals; it excludes farm animals and only 
applies to horses if they are used for research purposes.223 One provision of the Animal Welfare 
Act, known as the “pet theft act,” sets out a series of rules that aim to prevent pet animals from 
being stolen and sold for research.224 
Historically, state anti-cruelty laws have been similarly limited.  In the past, both state and 
federal laws prohibiting cruelty to animals have been criticized for their limited coverage, 
insufficient penalties, numerous exemptions, and low enforcement rates.225 
What is notable about the state animal cruelty laws, however, is the extent to which they 
have been strengthened in the past decade or so.  As recently as 1993, almost all state animal 
cruelty laws provided for offenses that were, at most, misdemeanors.  Only seven states at that 
time had felony animal abuse laws on their books.226 By 1999, twenty-three states had at least 
one form of felony law for animal abuse.227 As of the end of 2004, a total of forty-one states and 
the District of Columbia consider at least some types of animal abuse a felony.228 In addition to 
increasing penalties, state animal cruelty statutes have strengthened their reach by expanding the 
 
222 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1) (2000). 
223 7 U.S.C. § 2132 (g) (2000). 
224 7 U.S.C. § 2158 (2000). 
225 For limitations of anti-cruelty statutes, see Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 540-41 (1988).  The article, however was published in 1988, and a number of changes, 
including increased penalties, have occurred since then. 
226 See Stephan K. Otto, State Animal Protection Laws—The Next Generation, 11 ANIMAL L. 131 (2005).  
“California, Florida, Massachusetts, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin had all enacted felony 
animal abuse provisions by 1993.”  Id. at 132 n.1. 
227 See Frasch et al., supra note 218, at 69. 
228 See[this API page has evidently been deleted] HUMAN SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, STATE ANIMAL 
ANTI-CRUELTY PROVISIONS (2005), http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/State_cruelty_chart_June05-pdf.pdf.  See 
also Otto, supra note 226, at 132.  Note, however, the limitations to the felony laws: 
[S]tates are currently reserving felony status for the most egregious, affirmative acts of abuse, and 
are requiring a high degree of criminal culpability.  Many states are also restricting felony status to 
only subsequent offenses.  Others are further restricting felonies to include only those crimes 
committed against certain species of animals, typically those either defined as, or generally 
considered to be, companion animals. 
Id. at 137. 
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definition of animals covered by the statute; increasing the range of offenses to include, for 
example, animal fighting and ear-cropping of dogs.229 Many states have amended their statutes 
to allow courts to impose additional penalties, such as requiring reimbursement for the cost of 
caring for the injured animal, requiring behavioral counseling, and seizing the animals that are 
being mistreated or neglected.  Courts may also enjoin defendants from owning animals during a 
probation period, and some may even order defendants to forfeit their right to possess animals in 
the future. 
 State anti-cruelty statutes not only prohibit abusive treatment of animals, many state 
laws additionally impose affirmative duties on people who care for animals.230 California law, 
example, makes it a misdemeanor for an owner to permit the animal to be without “proper care 
and attention.”231 Another provision requires animal depositaries to “provide the animals with 
necessary and prompt veterinary care, nutrition, and shelter, and treat them kindly.”232 While the 
“treat them kindly” provision may be unique to California, laws imposing affirmative duties for 
proper housing, veterinary care, and feeding of animals are becoming increasingly common.233 
Another interesting feature of the state anti-cruelty laws is how much their coverage can 
vary by state.  Unlike the area of enforceable pet trusts, where most state laws are adopted either 
from the Uniform Probate Code or Uniform Trust Code, there is no Uniform Law of animal 
protection.  Rather, each state has its own unique statute prohibiting cruelty to animals, and while 
there may be some commonalities among these statutes, there are also important differences in 
the acts prohibited, animals covered, penalties, and exemptions.  Thus, in addition to the limited 
 
229 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-203(c)(ii) and (g) (2005) (defining cruelty to animals as owning dogs with 
the intent to allow the dogs to engage in fights, or being knowingly present at such a fight); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5511(h) (West Supp. 2005) (requiring a licensed veterinarian to perform any ear-cropping surgery). 
230 See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 252. 
231 CAL. PENAL CODE § 597f(a) (West 1999). 
232 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1834 (West Supp. 2006). 
233 See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 252-53. 
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protections of the Animal Welfare Act, which apply across all states, individual states, through 
their own animal cruelty statutes, are able to provide protections that can respond to the unique 
needs of that state.  In Tennessee, for example, the crime of cruelty to animals includes 
“inflict[ing] burns, cuts, lacerations, or other injuries or pain, by any method, including blistering 
compounds, to the legs or hooves of horses . . . .”234 This provision is a specific response to the 
local practice of “soring” (as in “making sore”), in various ways, the feet of Tennessee Walking 
Horses to exaggerate the high-stepping gait for which these horses are valued.235 
State law prohibiting animal cruelty is extremely dynamic.  In addition to the many 
changes seen in the past decade, many more are in the works.  In a number of jurisdictions, 
numerous proposed bills which are pending which would further strengthen the animal cruelty 
laws.  In Pennsylvania, for example, the current law applies harsher penalties for harm to dogs 
and cats than to other animals, whether the animal belongs to the offender or someone else.236 
One proposed amendment would apply these penalties to certain forms of cruelty to any animal, 
not just dogs and cats.237 Another pending bill would further increase penalties for harm to a 
guide dog.238 Similar proposals are pending in many other jurisdictions. 
Several features of newly enhanced animal cruelty statutes are worth noting because they 
resemble, in some ways, features of laws prohibiting child abuse.  Such provisions provide 
another indication that animals are being treated less like property, or at least less like inanimate 
forms of property.  In 1999, there were nine states that either required the reporting of animal 
 
234 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-14-202(a)(5) (Supp. 2004). 
235 “[T]his breed has suffered from cruel and abusive shoeing and training tactics to make the horses achieve 
their high step.  ‘Soring’ is the application of stinging or burning agents to the back of the foot to encourage the 
horse to raise its feet up.”  eHow, How to Choose a Tennessee Walker, http://www.ehow.com/how_9044_choose-
tennessee-walker.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). 
236 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(a)(2.1) (West Supp. 2005). 
237 H.R. 2326, 189th Leg., 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005) 
238 H.R. 1911, 189th Leg., 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005). 
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abuse or provided immunity for veterinarians who report such abuse.239 Currently ten states 
have such features in their laws.240 Such reporting features, especially in states where reporting 
is mandated, are notable in the way they resemble child abuse reporting statutes.  Another feature 
of interest is the potential for court-ordered counseling for offenders.  At least sixteen states have 
provisions in their animal cruelty statutes that allow courts to order offenders to undergo 
psychological or behavioral counseling.241 These provisions recognize that people who abuse 
animals are not only at risk to do so again, but are also more likely to engage in violent crimes 
against people.  Provisions that allow courts to mandate counseling are aimed at preventing both 
types of abuse. 
Another way in which animal cruelty laws are recognizing the connection between 
violence toward animals and violence toward people is by including provisions such as those in a 
2001 amendment to the Oregon animal cruelty statute.242 This amendment allows for increased 
penalties for those convicted of animal cruelty if the offender has a prior conviction of animal 
abuse, domestic violence, or an offense committed against a minor child.243 The provision also 
allows for increased penalties for offenders who knowingly commit the animal abuse in the 
 
239 Frasch et al, supra note 218, at 75. 
240 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-64-121 (West YEAR); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 4018 (YEAR); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 58B (West YEAR); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-39-87 (YEAR); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6714 
(McKinney YEAR); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 801.3585 (Vernon YEAR); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 2404 (YEAR); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.76 (YEAR); MD. CODE REGS. 15.14.15.01 (2005) (all providing veterinarian reporting 
immunity).  Illinois requires veterinarians to report abuse.  See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/25.19 (West YEAR). 
241 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-62-101(c) (Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-202(2)(a.5)(II), (III) 
(West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.12(2)(a) (West Supp. 2005); 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3.02 (West 2004); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 717B.3A (West 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1031 (3-B) (Supp. 2004); MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-606(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.50(b) (West. 2004); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 343.21 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:22-17(d) (West Supp. 2005) (counseling for juveniles), 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-18-1(G) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003), OR. REV. STAT. § 167.350(4) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-14-212(f) (Supp. 2004), UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-301(9)(a) (2003), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 353(b) (Supp. 
2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.122(F) (Supp. 2005). 
242 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167.320 (4)(a) (2003). 
243 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167.320 (4)(a) (2003). 
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presence of a minor child.244 The Oregon statute, therefore, not only ties animal abuse together 
with domestic violence and child abuse, but it appears to create a special category of abuse that 
bridges both animal abuse and child abuse: animal abuse in the presence of a child. 
State cruelty laws, at a minimum, recognize that animals have the capacity to suffer, and 
these laws seek to reduce that suffering.  In states where a particular type of animal suffering is 
prevalent, such as the abuse of Tennessee Walking Horses, state laws are increasingly 
recognizing and specifically prohibiting that form of abuse.  And in a number of states, the 
animal cruelty laws recognize a connection between abusing animals and abusing people.  
Looking together at these various features of anti-cruelty leads to an unmistakable conclusion: 
the ways in which such laws protect animals goes a long way towards recognizing a legal status 
of animals that is significantly different from that of other things that the law considers property. 
5. Language Shift from “Owner” to “Guardian”
There is one additional statutory change that is worth noting, although its significance is 
more symbolic than legally meaningful.  One state law and twelve local ordinances have 
changed the language describing the relationship between people and their animals from “owner” 
to “guardian.”245 Some of these laws, such as Rhode Island’s state law on animal cruelty, have 
actually supplemented, rather than replaced “owner” terminology with the word “guardian.”246 
244 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167.320 (4)(b) (2003) (“For purposes of this paragraph, a minor child is in the 
immediate presence of animal abuse if the abuse is seen or directly perceived in any other manner by the minor 
child.”).  See also Otto, supra note 226, at 146, citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167.320. 
245 See R.I. GEN LAWS § 4-1-1 (Supp. 2003); See also National Ass’n for Biomedical Research, Animal Law 
Section, Ownership v. Guardianship, http://www.nabr.org/AnimalLaw/Guardianship/index.htm (last visited Sept. 
26, 2005) (listing the 12 cites or towns and the state of Rhode Island that include guardianship language in their 
laws). 
246 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-1(a)(4), § 4-13-1.2(10), and § 4-19-2(28) (Supp. 2003) (adding the definition of 
“guardian” but not removing “Owner keeper”); BOULDER, COLO., CODE § 6-1-2 (2005) (“‘Guardian’ means 
owner”); BERKELEY, CAL., CODE § 10.04.010 (2001) (defining “Owner/guardian”); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE 
art. I § 41(m) (2003) (allowing “guardian” and “owner” to be used interchangeably in the Code). 
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And as the statute makes clear, this language change does not change in any way a person’s legal 
obligations to her animals: 
“Guardian” shall mean a person(s) having the same rights and responsibilities of 
an owner, and both terms shall be used interchangeably. A guardian shall also 
mean a person who possesses, has title to or an interest in, harbors or has control, 
custody or possession of an animal and who is responsible for an animal’s safety 
and well-being.247 
Although Rhode Island is the only state to have made such a change to its animal protection 
laws, there are a total of twelve cities or towns – including Boulder, Colorado; Berkeley, West 
Hollywood, and San Francisco, California; St. Louis, Missouri; and Woodstock, New York –  
that have enacted similar language changes.248 
While it appears that these language changes have no real legal effect,249 the laws have 
generated a good deal of controversy, and two sides have emerged, staking out opposing 
positions.  Proponents hope that by changing the legal language from owner to guardian, the 
attitudes and understanding about our responsibilities to animals will change for the better.250 
Those who promoted such laws hope that they will serve an educational role, and will help 
people to see that they have greater responsibilities to their pets than to other property that they 
own, even though these laws do not actually change animals’ status to something other than 
property.251 Groups that oppose such language changes, including a number of veterinary 
groups, claim that such changes threaten to undermine, rather than strengthen, the relationship 
between people and their pets.252 They claim, for example, that pet “guardians” might be faced 
 
247 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-1(a)(4) (Supp. 2003). 
248 See National Association for Biomedical Research, Animal Law Section, Ownership v. Guardianship, supra 
note 245. 
249 But see id.: “While this campaign is marketed as a feel-good exercise, this “simple” change in language 
elevates animals above their current status as property – with potentially enormous legal implications.” 
250 See R. Scott Nolen, Owners or guardians? Cities change identity of pet owners, hoping to promote welfare, 
J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, April 15, 2001, http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/apr01/s041501b.asp.
251 See Huss, supra note 143, at 197-99 and accompanying notes. 
252 See AVMA opposes ‘pet guardianship’ No evidence ‘guardianship’ enhances relationship between owner 
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with more limited health care choices for their pets, and that veterinarians might have trouble 
clarifying who should be making the choices regarding an animal’s care.253 Codifying this 
opposition, the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) – the veterinary equivalent 
of the AMA – has adopted an official position statement against such terminology changes.  
Approved by their executive board in May 2003, their resolution reads as follows: 
Ownership vs. Guardianship 
The American Veterinary Medical Association promotes the optimal health and 
well-being of animals. Further, the AVMA recognizes the role of responsible 
owners in providing for their animals’ care. Any change in terminology 
describing the relationship between animals and owners does not strengthen this 
relationship and may, in fact, diminish it. Such changes in terminology may 
decrease the ability of veterinarians to provide services and, ultimately, result in 
animal suffering.254 
The AVMA may have additional concerns with the implications of the changes in terminology 
for their member veterinarians that are not expressed in their official position statement.  Similar 
opposition has been expressed by the American Veterinary Medical Law Association (AVMLA), 
whose “White Paper” raises numerous legal concerns that could arise for veterinarians if their 
clients become guardians rather than owners of animals.255 
Pressure from groups such as the AVMA and AVMLA was presumably behind a 
resolution recently adopted by the Council of State Governments (CSG) Governing Boards, 
which sets out its opposition to “legislation that reclassifies pet, livestock or animal owners as 
guardians or that otherwise alters the legal status of animals . . . .”256 The reasons the CSG gives 
 
and pet, JAVMA NEWS, July 1, 2003, http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/jul03/030701i.asp.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 See AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL LAW ASS’N, OWNERSHIP OF ANIMALS VS. GUARDIANSHIP OF 
ANIMALS: THE EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN THE LAW ON VETERINARIANS IN CALIFORNIA (2002), available at 
http://www.nabr.org/AnimalLaw/Guardianship/AVMLAWhitePaper.pdf
256 The same resolution also sets out the CSG’s opposition to any legislation that allows recovery of non-
economic damages for the loss or injury of a pet, including its opposition to recovery for loss of companionship and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.  See Council of State Governments, Policy Resolutions, Fall 2004, 
available at http://www.csg.org/CSG/Policy/CSG+policy+positions/default.htm.
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for its resolution include a claim that such statutes would limit owners’ freedom of choice in 
caring for their animals, permit third parties to petition for a pet’s custody, permit a legal 
challenge to treatment choices of owners and veterinarians, and generally threaten the legal 
balance between the rights of pet owners and the well-being of animals.257 This resolution was 
adopted in September of 2004.  Given its adoption, it is unlikely that many states will be 
following Rhode Island’s lead in supplementing or changing the language of animal “owner” to 
that of animal “guardian.”258 
It may seem curious that there is so much organized opposition to a change in language 
that has no current legal effect.  At first blush, one might expect veterinarians who treat 
companion animals to embrace such language.  The concerns regarding the use of the term 
“guardian” for pet owners appear to center around fears of where such language could lead.  And 
it is this fear that has generated opposition from groups of veterinarians, researchers, and state 
legislators against the “potentially enormous legal implications”259 of what many proponents see 
as a simple language change to help better educate the public about responsibilities toward pets.  
Proponents want to see more responsible pet ownership, while opponents seem to fear the 
implications of moving toward personhood status for pets.  The problem seems to lie in the 
potential legal implications of a term – guardian – that already carries a legally significant 
meaning.260 Because of what the term “guardian” implies in relationships between people,261 
257 Id.
258As one commentator has noted, however, it may matter less whether more states and localities ultimately 
change language in their animal protection laws from owner to guardian, and more that such debates are happening 
at all.  See Huss, supra note 143, at 199-200. 
259 See National Association for Biomedical Research, supra note 245. 
260 In fact, this very concern is explicitly addressed in the March 9, 2005 position statement of the Pennsylvania 
Veterinary Medical Association (PVMA), setting out its opposition to the change to guardian language: “Guardian is 
a well-defined legal term that is not appropriate in describing the relationship between owners and their animals.”  
See Pennsylvania Veterinary Medical Ass’n, Position Statements, (Mar. 9, 2005), 
http://www.pavma.org/Images/05_Apr_Position_Stmnts.pdf.
261 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 725 (8th ed. 2004) (defining guardian as “one who has the legal authority 
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those who take a more conservative approach to any changes in the legal status of pets fear the 
implications of legislating the use of this term to describe pet owners.   
Educating pet owners about their responsibilities appears to be a laudable goal and 
certainly not a controversial one.  If that goal is going to be accomplished through changes in 
statutory language or other changes to the legal status of pets, it needs to be done through a new 
legal category and through terminology that is not already fraught with legal meaning that will 
raise the concerns and fears of people who work with animals.  The next section of this article 
proposes just such a category. 
 
Part IV:  The Above Described Legal Changes Should Be Formally 
Recognized by Creating a New Legal Category for Companion Animals
As the above sections demonstrate, public attitudes and many of our current laws already 
reflect many ways in which non-human animals, and especially companion animals, are treated 
fundamentally differently from inanimate property.  Cruelty statutes recognize that animals can 
suffer from inhumane treatment; more and more states are making such treatment felony 
offenses.  Many animal protection statutes go even further, imposing a number of affirmative 
duties on owners or guardians to care for animals properly.  Other laws in areas as diverse as 
estates and trusts, marriage dissolution, and tort law are increasingly recognizing a different 
status for companion animals by acknowledging the bond that can exist between humans and the 
animals they care for.  In many states, companion animals can now benefit from enforceable 
trusts after an owner’s death; courts are showing an increasing willingness to consider an 
animal’s interest in custody decisions; and both courts and legislatures are finding ways of 
awarding damages above “fair market value” when a companion animal is killed or injured. 
Despite these trends, the differences between animals and inanimate property need to be 
 
and duty to care for another’s person or property”) (emphasis added). 
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more clearly reflected in our laws, because there are still too many cases where the results under 
current laws are inconsistent with this understanding of companion animals.  Many courts 
continue to struggle with appropriate damage awards in tort cases.  While some recent cases have 
seen awards as high as $30,000 on “actual value to owner” theories262, other courts – even those 
that seem quite sympathetic to arguments that companion animals are simply different from 
other fungible property – feel that their hands are tied by existing laws that define animals as 
property.263 Such problems could be alleviated by formally creating a new legal status for 
companion animals – a category that recognizes that, while animal are not persons, there are 
many reasons for the law to treat them differently from fungible personal property. 
A separate legal category for companion animals has both intuitive appeal and would 
better reflect the way in which we value companion animals in our society.  First, the category 
would appeal to the intuitive notion that many judges have expressed: that “[pets occupy] a 
special place somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal property,”264 and that the 
“property” label “inadequately and inaccurately describes the relationship between a human and 
a dog.”265 And there is a tremendous amount of evidence that our society values companion 
animals in a way that is fundamentally different from the way we value other property: we spend 
large amounts of money on their veterinary care, we give them birthday presents, get them pet 
sitters or leave them in “doggie day care,”266 we take them on vacations with us, 267 and we make 
 
262 See supra notes 70-71. 
263 See, e.g., supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text. 
264 Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979). 
265 Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001). 
266 See, e.g., Sharene Azimi, Move Over Subway, Dog Day Care Is The Hot New Franchise, COLUMBIA NEWS 
SERVICE, March 1, 2005, http://jscms.jrn.columbia.edu/cns/2005-03-01/azimi-doggydaycare.
267 See, e.g., Pets on the Go, Pet Travel Unleashed, http://www.petsonthego.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2005); 
Pets Welcome, It’s a Pet Friendly Universe Out There, http://www.petswelcome.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2005); 
Pet Travel, U.S., http://www.pettravel.us/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2005). 
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serious efforts to provide for their care after our death.268 An even more vivid reminder of just 
how highly people value their animals was demonstrated by all of those who refused to evacuate 
Hurricane Katrina-damaged New Orleans without their animals.269 These refusals caused so 
many problems that the evacuation policy was quickly changed, and those boarding the buses 
evacuating Texas residents as Hurricane Rita approached were allowed to bring their pets 
along.270 
A legal approach recognizing companion animals as falling somewhere between persons 
and inanimate property would be consistent with the most conservative scientific and moral 
theories of animals’ status.  While there is much disagreement about the extent of animal 
intelligence, ability for self-recognition, theory of mind, intentionality, and autonomy,271 no one 
seriously argues the capacity of companion animals such as dogs and cats to suffer, or to feel 
pain.272 This agreement can in part be seen in the frequency with which is quoted a famous line 
of Jeremy Bentham: “the question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they 
suffer?”273 Recognizing this capacity to suffer, a capacity that is certainly not shared by 
inanimate property, provides another reason to create a distinct legal category for companion 
animals. 
 
268 See supra notes 199-211 and accompanying text. 
269 See, e.g., Craig Guillot, Not Without my Dog: For many, leaving four-legged companions behind wasn’t an 
option,, 33 Bark 85 (2005). 
270 See Gina Spadafori, Including Pets In Evacuation Plans Could Save Human Lives, BOSTON GLOBE Oct. 13, 
2005, at C6, available at 
http://www.boston.com/yourlife/home/articles/2005/10/13/including_pets_in_evacuation_plans_could_save_human
_lives/.
271 See Lesley J. Rogers & Gisela Kaplan, All Animals Are Not Equal: The Interface between Scientific 
Knowledge and Legislation for Animal Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 175. 
272 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 388 (2003).  “Almost everyone 
agrees that people should not be able to torture animals or to engage in acts of cruelty against them.”  Id. at 389. 
273 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 310-11 n.1 (Prometheus Books, 1988) 
(1823), quoted in Sunstein, supra note 272; Patrick Lee, Soul, Body, and Personhood, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 87, 117 
(2004); Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1506 (2001) 
(reviewing STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000)) (describing 
Bentham’s language as “a famous footnote”). 
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A.  A New Legal Category: Companion Animal Property  
 
This article proposes the legislative creation of a new status that formally recognizes 
companion animals as a distinct legal category: “companion animal property.”  This proposal 
takes up Judge Andell’s call that “[t]he law should reflect society’s recognition that animals are 
sentient and emotive beings that are capable of providing companionship to the humans with 
whom they live.”274 The “companion animal property” category would thus take into account 
companion animals’ dependence on their human owners, their capacity to suffer if mistreated or 
neglected, and the bonds that we form with our animals and that they form with us.  The 
resulting legal category would clarify, in ways that our current laws do not yet achieve, that we 
therefore have certain responsibilities toward our living property that we simply do not have 
toward inanimate property. 
The companion animal property category acknowledges the capacity for humans to form 
strong bonds with their animal companions.  Evidence of these bonds is already seen in a number 
of ways within the veterinary profession.  For example, the amounts of money that people are 
willing to spend on treating their companion animals has given rise to the growth of many 
specialty areas within the field of small animal medicine.275 And a large number of veterinary 
schools now have bereavement programs that help people deal with the loss of their companion 
animal.276 Other schools have programs that specifically study the human-animal bond.277 
274 Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377-78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (Andell, J. concurring). 
275 See Green, supra note 4, at 170, 210 (reporting that pet owners spend more than $19 billion annually on 
veterinary care and that such spending has provided veterinarians with “limitless opportunities to expand the 
practice of their craft.”).  The American Veterinary Medical Association formally recognizes thirty-six veterinary 
specialties.  Id. at 211.  It is likely that somewhat different forces are driving the growth of specialty areas in other 
parts of veterinary practice.  In equine medicine, for example, owners are often willing to spend large amounts on 
animals for a variety of reasons, sometimes because of the bonds they have formed with pet horses, but often 
because of the high market value of race horses. 
276 See, e.g., Colorado State University, Argus Institute for Families and Veterinary Medicine, 
http://www.argusinstitute.colostate.edu/grief.htm; University of Florida School of Veterinary Medicine, Pet Loss, 
http://neuro.vetmed.ufl.edu/alt_med/petgrief/petloss.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2005). 
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In addition to recognizing the bonds between humans and animals, formally creating a 
new legal category for companion animals leads to more consistency in the law and would help 
to make sense of a number of judicial and legislative trends that have been emerging in the past 
decade or more.  As discussed above, changes are occurring in areas of law as diverse as estates 
and trusts, criminal law and tort law.  But the changes are happening in an uneven fashion, which 
can lead to a variety of anomalous results. Within the same jurisdiction, for example, an animal 
might be the subject of an enforceable trust that is funded with a large amount of money, but if 
that same animal is negligently killed, its guardian may not be able to recover more than its 
minimal market value.  In one state, owners of a negligently injured animal might not even be 
able to recover veterinary expenses to pay for treatment made necessary by the injury.  Yet in 
other states, the same owner might be able to recover treatment expenses, along with 
compensatory damages for emotional distress and punitive damages.278 Officially recognizing 
these changes by creating a legal category for companion animals will lead to more consistency 
both within and across these various areas of law. 
B. Comparisons to Other Proposals on Animals’ Legal Status 
Creating a new legal category for companion animals that treats them as an enhanced 
type of property – one that recognizes their important differences from inanimate property – 
would likely gain greater acceptance and avoid much of the controversy generated by other 
proposals that can be grouped into the “animal rights” camp.  The most controversial of these 
proposals are those that aim to completely change the property status of animals, seeking instead 
 
277 See, e.g., Animal Medical Center, Hospital Services – Counseling, 
http://www.amcny.org/department/counseling.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2005); Penn Veterinary Medicine, Clinical 
Services, http://www.vet.upenn.edu/ryan/services/socialwork/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2005); Purdue University 
School of Veterinary Medicine, Center for the Human-Animal Bond, http://www.vet.purdue.edu/chab/index.htm
(last visited Sept. 27, 2005). 
278 While it is true having different approaches in different states is a cornerstone of federalism, it may well be 
problematic when neighboring states have such disparate approaches. 
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a form of legal “personhood” for animals.279 Less controversial proposals range from one that 
would create a different type of property status where animals retain an “equitable self-
ownership” in their own title,280 to an argument that animal rights already exist, but they need to 
be better enforced by allowing actions by private citizens and by animals represented by human 
beings.281 
A number of commentators would eliminate animals’ property status altogether and grant 
them a legal status akin to personhood.  Steven Wise asserts that humans enjoy rights that are not 
available to nonhuman animals because of “speciesism,” discrimination against other animal 
species that cannot be justified by any meaningful differences between humans and other 
animals.282 Instead, he sets out a quality that he calls “practical autonomy,”283 which he argues is 
sufficient to entitle any species to basic liberty rights.284 Gary Francione also advocates for 
eliminating the property status of animals and granting them legal personhood.285 Francione 
rejects any compromise proposals that retain animals’ legal status as property.286 He advocates 
extending to animals “the right not to be property” and sees the only other option to be making 
them moral persons.287 Francione agrees with Wise that it is unjustifiable speciesism, rather than 
 
279 See infra notes 282-288 (discussing the theories of Steven Wise and Gary Francione). 
280 See infra notes 289-294 (discussing the David Favre proposal). 
281 See infra notes 295-300 (discussing the theories of Cass Sunstein). 
282 See, e.g., Steven M. Wise, Animal Rights, One Step at a Time, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 19.  “To 
avoid speciesism, we must identify some objective, rational, legitimate, and nonarbitrary quality possessed by every 
Homo sapiens that is possessed by no nonhuman that should entitle all of us, but none of them, to basis liberty 
rights.  But none exists.”  Id. at 27. 
283 Wise defines “practical autonomy” as the ability to desire, intentionally try to fulfill the desire, and possess 
“a sense of self sufficiency to allow her to understand, even dimly, that she is a being who wants something and is 
trying to get it.”  Id. at 32.  See also STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL 
RIGHTS 32 (2002). 
284 Wise, supra note 282, at 27. 
285 See Francione, supra note 16, at i, and Francione, supra note 19, at 108. 
286 GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1 
(1996). 
287 Francione, supra note 19, at 131 (“Nor can we use animal welfare laws to render animals ‘quasi-persons’ or 
‘things plus.’ . . .  There is no third choice.”) 
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any morally justifiable difference, that accounts for the property status of nonhuman animals.288 
David Favre takes issue with animal activists like Wise and Francione who want to 
eliminate animals’ property status, claiming that such a stance is both unwise and unnecessary.289 
Favre not only sees such a change in the status of animals as highly unlikely, he also believes 
that such a change is a bad idea, especially if it leads to the elimination of domestic animals.290 
And he thinks that eliminating property status is unnecessary because he sees another way to 
achieve improvement in the legal status of animals: by retaining animals’ status as property but 
dividing their title into legal and equitable components, creating a form of self-ownership that he 
calls “equitable self-ownership.”291 With his proposal, Favre hopes to “shift the nature of the 
relationship between the owner and the animal from that which is like the ownership of [a] rock 
to that which is more like, but not identical to, the custodial relationship of the human parent and 
the human child.”292 Favre hopes to achieve this goal by blending the previously separated 
categories of property ownership and juristic persons.293 He envisions that this new status will 
lead to changes in the legal obligations that humans have to the animals in their care, and that the 
nature of these duties will arise primarily from two sources: animal protection (anti-cruelty) 
statutes and legal concepts that define the relationship between parents and children.294 
Cass Sunstein’s approach is similar in some respects to Favre’s.  Sunstein argues that 
animals already enjoy many rights, if we understand “rights” to mean legal protections against 
 
288 Id. at 130-31.  “In the end, the only difference between humans and animals is species, and species is not a 
justification for treating animals as property any more than is race a justification for human slavery.”  Id. at 131. 
289 See David Favre, Integrating Animal Interests into Our Legal System, 10 ANIMAL L. 87, 90 (2004). 
290 Id. at 91. 
291 See David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473, 476 (2000) [hereinafter 
Equitable Self-Ownership].  See also David Favre, A New Property Status for Animals: Equitable Self-Ownership, in 
ANIMAL RIGHTS supra note 18, at 234, 237 [hereinafter A New Property Status]. 
292 Favre, A New Property Status, supra note 291, at 238-39. 
293 Id. at 245. Cf. Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159 (2005) (proposing a combined property and person framework for analyzing disputes 
relating to embryos and fetuses). 
294 Favre, A New Property Status, supra note 291, at 245. 
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harm.295 State anti-cruelty laws, along with the federal laws such as the Animal Welfare Act, 
provide these rights to animals.296 Sunstein, like Favre, thus focuses on the role of existing laws 
to provide protections for animals.  The problem is not that animals lack protections or rights, but 
that these rights are not adequately enforced.297 Sunstein proposes closing this “enforcement 
gap” by allowing private parties to bring actions directly against those who violate state or 
federal laws.298 He additionally advocates allowing animals to bring suits against such violators 
through human representatives.299 Animals’ status can best be improved by improving 
enforcement of their existing rights.  Sunstein is less concerned over whether animals are 
classified as property or persons and more concerned with the specific rights and duties that such 
labeling might suggest.300 
C.  A Suggested Starting Point to Defining Companion Animal Property 
The goal of this section is to suggest a starting point for defining the new legal category, 
“companion animal property.”301 The hope is that the ideas proposed here will begin a 
conversation of how the legal status of companion animals can be changed incrementally to 
better recognize the bonds between humans and their companion animals, to continue legal 
trends that have already begun, and to gain broader acceptance than the proposals that would 
grant personhood status to animals.   
 
295 Sunstein, Introduction: What are Animal Rights?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 3, 5. 
296 Sunstein, supra note 34, at 252.  Sunstein goes as far as to suggest that these federal laws might be seen as a 
bill of rights for animals.  Id. at 255. 
297 See Sunstein, supra note 295, at 7 (discussing the “enforcement gap”). 
298 Sunstein, supra note 34, at 261. 
299 Id. at 252. 
300 Sunstein, supra note 295, at 11. 
What does it mean to say that animals are property and can be “owned”?  . . . Ownership is just a 
label, connoting a certain set of rights and perhaps duties . . . .  A state could dramatically increase 
enforcement of existing bans on cruelty and neglect without turning animals into persons, or 
making them into something other than property. . . .  It might, in these circumstances, seem 
puzzling that so many people are focusing on the question of whether animals are property. 
Id.
301 The ideas proposed here are only the beginning of what I hope will be an ongoing discussion.  In my next 
article, I expect to further flesh out the proposal begun here. 
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This article’s proposal of creating a legal category of “companion animal property” 
would, like Sunstein’s proposal, retain the property status of animals and not take on the battle of 
changing their status to one approaching that of persons.  The proposal advocates an incremental 
change in the legal status of companion animals to more accurately reflect the direction that our 
laws, especially the recent developments in trust law,302 are going. 
There are a number of ways to define and limit the companion animal property category 
so as to avoid various parade-of-horrors scenarios303 put forth by those who object to anything 
that smacks of “animal rights.”304 One limitation would focus on the animal’s role and its 
relationship with its human owner or guardian.  Such a limitation can be found in Carolyn 
Matlack’s proposed legal category for companion animals that she calls “sentient property.”305 
Matlack, an attorney who is the president and managing editor of Animal Legal Report Services, 
sets forth her “sentient property” category as a compromise on the legal status of pets that would 
recognize them as living, feeling companions but would not give them anything approaching the 
rights of persons.306 Matlack defines sentient property as “any warm blooded, domesticated 
nonhuman animal dependent on one or more humans for food, shelter, veterinary care, or 
 
302 But see Favre, supra note 289, at 94 (describing the recent changes in trust law as “a conceptual 
breakthrough for the United States Legal System.  Animals have been granted legal personhood for the purposes of 
trust enforcement.”) 
303 Objections to changes in the legal status of animals range from claims that people will no longer be able to 
keep animals as pets, to claims that we’ll no longer be able to kill the rats and mice (or even cockroaches) that 
invade our homes, to the end of all research involving animals.  This proposal would not affect any of these 
scenarios. 
304 One commentator who has come out strongly against animal rights admits that “it would be simply insane to 
insist that animals should be treated like inanimate objects.”  Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of 
Rights, in ANIMAL LAW, supra note 18, at 143, 156. 
305 See Letter from Carolyn Matlack to the Texas Third Circuit Court of Appeals, (Apr. 13, 2004) (on file with 
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306 See R. Scott Nolen, Sentient Property: A Novel Animal Law Proposal, JAVMA NEWS, Sept. 15, 2004, 
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v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 561 n.6 (Tex. App. 2004).  She expands on her ideas in her book, We’ve Got Feelings 
Too (forthcoming 2006). 
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compassion and typically kept in or near the household of its owner, guardian, or keeper.”307 
Her definition thus focuses on the animal’s dependence on its owner and the closeness of its 
living arrangements.  The only limitation on the type of animal would be that it is warm-blooded 
and domesticated. 
This article proposes a companion animal property category that would be even more 
limited.  First, it would focus on the animal’s role and would clarify that the category only 
applies to companion animals, or pets, and not to domesticated farm animals that might live near 
their owner’s home.  Second, instead of applying to any warm-blooded animal, this category 
would limit, by species, the types of animals to which it would apply.  As a starting point, the 
category would be limited to animals that are typically kept as pets: dogs and cats.308 While this 
new legal category would begin with this very narrowly defined class of animals, it might also be 
reasonable to set out ways in which the definition could start with a presumption that it only 
applies to dogs and cats, but allow for evidence that other animals could qualify as companion 
animals if certain criteria were met.309 Additional companion animals might include backyard 
horses, parrots and other tropical birds, “pocket pets,” such as ferrets, guinea pigs, hamsters, 
rabbits, and pot-bellied pigs. 
Once this new category is defined by the animals to which it would apply, its legal effect 
needs to be shaped.  In many ways, this category would simply conform to legal trends that have 
already occurred in areas of animal cruelty law and estates law.  In other ways, and in other areas 
of law, the category would have additional legal effects of its own.  Statutes that make cruelty to 
 
307 See Matlack, Letter, supra note 305.  In her letter to the Texas court, Matlack explains: “This reclassification 
allows an incremental increase in the legal status of companion animals, recognizing that they have feelings and 
emotions without upsetting the judicial system and the rest of the scientific and legal communities that currently 
classify animals as plain property.” 
308 A similar limitation can be found in Tennessee’s T-Bo Act.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(b) (Supp. 2005). 
309 Such criteria could include evidence of the animal’s bond with its human owner, where it lives, how often 
the person and animal interact, and veterinary records that show how the animal has been cared for. 
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animals a criminal offense, that create affirmative duties to the animals we keep in our homes, 
and that allow us to leave enforceable trusts to our pets already recognize that these animals are 
in a different legal category from inanimate property, even if that category has not yet been 
named.  The companion animal property category would encourage these legal trends to continue 
and would provide a more rational terminology to support these trends in the law. 
The new category will create additional legal effects in areas such as tort law, lost and 
found animal disputes, and custody upon marriage dissolution.  Courts would no longer need to 
be constrained by the “mere property” label in awarding damages that recognize the bond 
between people and their companion animals.310 Decisions about who gets custody of a lost and 
found animal would be based on principles that are not about property ownership, but would 
rather look at who has formed a closer bond to the animal, or who can provide a better home for 
it.  Following the lead of the Vermont Supreme Court,311 these decisions could take into account 
the importance of encouraging finders of lost animals to care for and develop relationships with 
them.  And custody awards could take into account the animal’s attachment to each spouse and 
the animal’s best interest, avoiding decisions such as the recent Pennsylvania one denying a 
visitation and shared custody request because it was “analogous, in law, to a visitation schedule 
for a table or a lamp.”312 
D.  Should Courts or Legislatures Enact Changes to Animals’ Legal Status? 
A debate exists among those who advocate changing the legal status of animals about 
whether such changes ought to be judicially or legislatively enacted.313 Matlack, for example, 
presents her “sentient property” proposal as a compromise for judges who want to move beyond 
 
310 See Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377-78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). 
311 See Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630 (Vt. 1997). 
312 See Desanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). 
313 See, e.g., Wise, supra note 282, at 28-29; see generally ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18. 
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laws that treat animals as inanimate property.314 Other commentators have suggested various 
options for legislative change.315 While the notion of incremental judge-made changes has 
certain appeal, experience has shown that such change with regards to the status of animal 
happens slowly, if at all.  A number of judges who seemed to be open to the idea of such changes 
have nevertheless claimed to be constrained by precedent; some have directly deferred to the 
legislature to enact them.316 For this and other reasons, legislative change seems to make the 
most sense.  The experience with legislatively enacted enforceable trusts and with legislation that 
increases animal cruelty offenses to felonies shows that legislation protecting the interests of 
companion animals can be effective. 
Another reason to favor legislative change is that the legislation can at the same time 
address the concerns of those who seem most opposed to any formal change in the legal status of 
animals.  There has been some organized opposition to changing the legal status of animals by 
the veterinary community, much of which seems to be driven by malpractice concerns.  If the 
source of this opposition can be alleviated by addressing the fear of increased malpractice 
premiums by including caps on damage awards in any legislative change, then perhaps much of 
the opposition would dissipate.  Similarly, the opposition to change that has come from the 
research community317 would likely be alleviated if changes to the status of companion animals 
were narrowly defined in a way that did not affect their research interests.  Limiting the animals 
 
314 See Carolyn B. Matlack, The Sentient (Feeling) Property Solution: Unleashing Sensible Legal Respect for 
Companion Animals (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“While our “judge-made” or “common law” 
prides itself in being able to change and grow with the times, the actual process is replete with fits and starts . . . .  
Without suggestion of another acceptable way to do it, judges are compelled by existing case law precedent to come 
to the same old outdated decisions.”) 
315 See, e.g.,  Waisman & Newell, supra note 39. 
316 See, e.g., Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp. 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); Petco Animal 
Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 565 (Tex. App. 2004). 
317 See, e.g., National Ass’n for Biomedical Research, Animal Law Section, 
http://www.nabr.org/AnimalLaw/index.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2005); Steve Michael, Animal Personhood – A 
Threat to Research?, PHYSIOLOGIST, Dec. 2004, at 449, available at http://www.the-
aps.org/publications/tphys/2004html/DecTPhys/michael.htm. 
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to which such changes would apply both by species and by their roles in the lives of humans 
would respond, at least in part, to many of the concerns raised by the research community.318 
One obstacle to legislative change that might be difficult to overcome is the Council of 
State Government’s recently adopted Resolution on Animal Guardianship and Liability 
Legislation.319 Asserting that the proper balance between responsible animal care and the rights 
of pet owners and livestock producers can already be found within the existing legal framework, 
and that this balance is being threatened by those who want to give personhood rights to animals 
and who advocate for the recovery of non-economic damages in tort cases involving injured 
animals, the Council formally opposes two types of legislative change: (1) “legislation that 
reclassifies pet, livestock or animal owners as guardians or that otherwise alters the legal status 
of the animals,” and (2) “legislation permitting the recovery of non-economic damages for the 
loss or injury of a pet, livestock or other animal.”320 
Given their stated opposition to any legislation that “alters the legal status of animals,” it 
is hard to imagine this group not opposing the creation of a legal category, companion animal 
property.  It would be important to present the proposal as one that does not really effect actual 
change, but merely codifies changes that are already occurring.  In fact, the argument would go, 
these are the very changes that have created the current “healthy balance”321 between the rights 
 
318 Organizations representing animal researchers perceive many of the recent changes in various areas of 
animal law as a “clear threat to animal research.” See Michael, supra note 317.  To respond to this threat, a number 
of scientific organizations have initiated a project that is coordinated through the National Association for 
Biomedical Research.  The project’s stated goal “is to be fully prepared when and if a significant “personhood” or 
other “animal law” case is brought before a federal or state court.”  Id. Because this article’s proposed change does 
not suggest that animals be given personhood status, it may be of less concern to this community.  The group seems 
opposed, however, to what it sees as the “long-term, step-by-step strategy” of the animal rights movement to move 
toward legal personhood, citing changes from non-economic damage awards to enforceable trusts for pets to 
changes from “owner” to “guardian” language.”  Id. Given this view, it is likely that these researchers would view 
any incremental change as suspect, even if it were narrowly constructed to avoid any conflicts with their interest in 
animal research. 
319 See Council of State Governments, supra note 256. 
320 Id.
321 See id.
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of animals and the rights of those who care for them.  Formally creating a category for 
companion animal property would help to ensure that we do not return to the time when 
companion animals were more likely to be viewed as fungible, throw-away property, when 
penalties for animal abuse were less harsh and even less likely to be enforced. 
Overcoming opposition to legislative change will not necessarily be easy.  But if the 
legislation can be tailored to address the major concerns of those who are most likely to oppose 
it, and its passage can be presented as a logical next step in protecting the interests of animals 
and reflecting the values of those who care for and work with them, then the creation of the legal 
category companion animal property might be feasible.  And contrasting this proposal with those 
that would go much farther in extending rights to animals could help to garner additional 
support. 
E.  Effects of Additional Distinctions Between and Within Species 
 
Defining the legal category companion animal property both by types of animal and by 
the animal’s role could admittedly create additional distinctions both between and within animal 
species.  But it is important to realize that such distinctions have always existed in our laws 
protecting animals, and it is likely that they always will.  There are good reasons for many of the 
legal differences that exist between animal species.322 The differences that exist based on how 
we use the animals323 may be harder to justify, but they are a reality of our current legal system 
that are unlikely to change anytime soon. 
Many current laws already treat animals differently by species.  The federal Animal 
Welfare Act, for example, regulates the use of animals in research, the commercial sale and 
 
322 See James Rachels, Drawing Lines, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 162 and Rodgers & Kaplan, supra 
note 271, at 175. 
323 See discussion on different ways of classifying animals, including classifying by use, in Duckler, supra note 
39, at 216-20. 
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transportation of animals, and exhibition of animals.324 These animal protection provisions, 
however, only apply to certain warm-blooded animals; all farm animals are exempted.325 Horses 
are covered by the Act, but only if they are used for research purposes.  Another provision of the 
Act, known as the “pet theft act” aims to prevent pet animals being stolen and sold for research.  
These sections only apply to dogs and cats.326 This law, therefore, makes clear distinctions 
among animal species, and, in the case of horses, by how the animal is used. 
Different treatment of animals can also be seen in a number of states’ animal cruelty 
statutes.  In Pennsylvania, for example, recent amendments to the animal protection law apply 
harsher penalties for harm to dogs and cats, whether the animal belongs to the offender or 
someone else.327 While some would propose applying these increased penalties to all animals, 
one specific proposed bill would further increase penalties for harm to a guide dog,328 not only 
maintaining the distinction by species, but adding an additional distinction based on how the 
animal is used. 
Most of the recent changes in the law apply only to cases of companion animals.  
Creating a legal category to codify those changes would additionally codify the different 
treatment of animals both between and within species.  And, while some judges have expressed 
 
324 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-59 (2000). 
325 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2000) defines the term animal for purposes of the Animal Welfare Act: 
The term “animal” means any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate mammal), guinea 
pig, hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as the Secretary may determine is being 
used, or is intended for use, for research, testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a 
pet; but such term excludes (1) birds, rats of the genus Rattus, and mice of the genus Mus, bred for 
use in research, (2) horses not used for research purposes, and (3) other farm animals, such as, but 
not limited to livestock or poultry, used or intended for use as food or fiber, or livestock or poultry 
used or intended for use for improving animal nutrition, breeding, management, or production 
efficiency, or for improving the quality of food or fiber. With respect to a dog, the term means all 
dogs including those used for hunting, security, or breeding purposes. 
326 7 U.S.C. § 2158 (2000). 
327 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(a)(2.1) (West Supp. 2005). 
328 H.R. 1911, 189th Leg., 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005). 
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concern about creating additional distinctions both within and between species,329 many courts, 
legislatures,330 and commentators331 accept both the need for and the inevitability of such 
distinctions.332 Thus the additional distinctions that this new category would create between and 
within species should not stand in the way of moving forward with these legal changes. 
Part V: The Impact of a New Legal Status for 
Companion Animals on the Veterinary Profession
This section explores the implications that the creation of a new legal category, 
companion animal property, might have on the veterinary profession.  Since there has already 
been some organized opposition in the veterinary community to changing the legal status of 
animals,333 and since strong veterinary opposition is likely to impede any real change in this 
area,334 it is important to look at how such a change might actually affect veterinarians.  This 
group would be less inclined to oppose such changes, and might even support them, if it sees that 
it is ultimately in the best interests of the profession to raise the status of companion animals 
 
329 In several of the cases cited in Parts II and III, courts have expressed concern about these distinctions both 
within and between species.  In Morgan v. Kroupa, one judge dissented from the majority’s holding that the “stray 
beast” language in Vermont’s property law statute did not apply to pet dogs: 
[A] clear line cannot always be drawn between animals kept for economic reasons and those kept as pets.  
Many people who keep livestock become emotionally attached to individual animals. Conversely, dogs 
may be owned primarily or solely for their economic value as work dogs or breeding stock.  And there are 
animals that fall somewhere in between, such as pleasure horses-- livestock that are not kept for their 
economic value, but are, in effect, large pets.  To separate some species of domesticated animals from 
others on an attempted livestock-pet dichotomy is a purely arbitrary interpretation of the statute. 
Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630, 636 (Vt. 1997) (Gibson, J., dissenting).  Similarly, one of the reasons that the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court gave for refusing to extend emotional distress damages for the loss of a dog was that it 
saw “no just stopping point”:  “Were we to recognize a claim for damages for the negligent loss of a dog, we can 
find little basis for rationally distinguishing other categories of animal companion.”  Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 
N.W.2d 795, 799 (Wis. 2001). 
330 See also Tennessee’s T-Bo Act.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (Supp. 2005). 
331 See, e.g., Huss, supra note 17, at 84-88 (discussing various laws that distinguish among animals based on 
their value to humans); Huss, supra note 9, at 533-534 (discussing different legal treatment of companion animals 
and food-producing animals, and proposing a new statutory provision for non-economic damages in veterinary 
malpractice actions that continues to treat animals differently by species). 
332 A New York bill proposed in January 2003 that would have allowed pets to recover damages for pain, 
suffering and loss of faculties was limited to dogs, cats, and “domestic animals receiving regular care.”  These 
limitations were justified, in part, by the greater political support for dogs and cats over farm animals and the fewer 
economic interests at stake.  See R. Scott Nolen, Legislation Presses Limits of Animal Status in New York: Harmed 
Pets Would be Entitled to Compensation, JAVMA NEWS, May 15, 2004, at 1573-74. 
333 See infra notes 266-269 and accompanying text. 
334 See Green, supra note 4, at 167-68. 
68
above that of inanimate property. 
Certainly, changes in the way we value companion animals in our society are already 
having both positive and negative impacts on the profession.  Owners of companion animals are 
more likely to spend money on both preventative and curative veterinary care, and this increased 
willingness has helped to support the increased specialization in veterinary medicine.335 But 
such owners are also more likely to have higher expectations for what veterinary medicine can 
accomplish, and they may be more likely to bring a malpractice claim if they are unhappy with 
the outcome.336 The profession will continue to experience these effects whether or not the legal 
status of companion animals changes.  This section will address the ways in which changing the 
law to reflect society’s changing values may affect veterinary medicine and education in ways 
that that go beyond the changes in societal values themselves. 
A.  Veterinary Opposition to Changing the Legal Status of Animals 
The American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) has expressed its opposition to 
changes in the legal status of animals in several position statements and resolutions.  As 
discussed in Section III(B)(5) above, the AVMA adopted a resolution in 2003 opposing any 
legislation that changes from “owner” to “guardian” the terminology describing a person’s 
relationship with her animals.337 The resolution claims that such change could weaken 
individuals’ relationships with their animals, limit veterinarians’ ability to provide services, “and, 
ultimately result in animal suffering.”338 And in a 2003 statement setting out the AVMA’s 
position on whether damage awards for injured animals should exceed their property value, the 
organization declares its support for the legal concept of animals as property, while recognizing 
 
335 See Green, supra note 4, at 209.  See also Huss, supra note 9, at 484-86; McEachern Nunalee & Weedon, 
supra note 6, at 138-39. 
336 Huss, supra note 9, at 494; McEachern Nunalee & Weedon, supra note 6, at 138. 
337 See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
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that “some animals have value to their owners that may exceed the animal’s market value.”339 
This statement apparently received limited support from the AVMA Executive Board, passing 
only after the Board’s Chair cast a tie-breaking vote.340 
Given all that veterinarians have gained, and will continue to gain, from the increased 
valuation of pets, it might seem curious that there is so much organized opposition to both 
changes in pets’ legal status and to their valuation above fair market value.  The most likely 
explanation for this opposition seems to lie in the profession’s concerns that increased status and 
valuation of animals will lead to an increased exposure to large malpractice awards against 
veterinarians.341 Veterinarians seem to be concerned that increasing the status and value of 
animals will mean that pet owners are more likely to bring suits when their pets are injured or 
killed, and that the amounts of damage awards will continue to increase.342 Both of these 
phenomena, they claim, will lead to a rise in malpractice premiums that will either drive them 
out of business or will make the cost of veterinary care prohibitive to the average pet owner.343 
B.  Responses to Veterinary Opposition 
There are several responses to this position.  One argument is that it is simply 
disingenuous for veterinarians, whose profession has achieved so much because of the increased 
status of animals, to say that these animals are really just property.344 And the awkwardness of 
such a position has not been lost on the veterinary profession itself, as seen in this statement of 
veterinarian James Wilson: 
 
339 See Executive Board Coverage: Several Factors at Play when Determining Compensatory Value of Animals, 
AVMA says, JAVMA NEWS, July 1, 2003, at 15.  The position statement goes on to suggest factors to consider in 
determining an animal’s monetary value, all of which are essentially of an economic nature. 
340 Id. The dissenters opined that “the statement focused too much on economic factors while not adequately 
accounting for the relationship between people and animals.” 
341 See Green, supra note 4, at 216 (discussing veterinarian profession’s “fear of limitless liability, of replicating 
the human medical malpractice ‘crisis;’ of inviting frivolous lawsuits; or even of being forced out of business”). 
342 See Huss, supra note 9, at 493-495 (discussing reasons for increases in veterinary malpractice claims). 
343 See McEachern Nunalee & Weedon, supra note 6, at 159-60. 
344 See Waisman & Newell, supra note 39, at 70-71. 
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Veterinarians must accept that they can no longer promote expenditures of time, 
money and emotional energy by owners . . . and then when something goes awry 
simply say, “Oh well, tough luck Mrs. Jones.  It’s just an animal under the law.  
Animals are merely personal property; therefore you may not collect damages for 
your loss, other than the market value of your pet.”345 
A similar understanding can be found in the charge of a recently approved AVMA task force on 
the Legal Status of Animals, which will recommend an AVMA policy position on animals’ 
status and valuation.346 Apparently meant to update and amend the 2003 resolution and policy 
statements discussed above, the task force is charged with looking at both the pros and cons of 
non-economic damage awards, determining when such awards are appropriate, and developing a 
list of legal protections that would be needed should guardianship laws be applied to animals.347 
The creation of the task force was driven, at least in part, by concerns about how the public will 
perceive veterinarian opposition to initiatives changing the status and valuation of animals.348 
The profession seems rightly concerned that such opposition could easily damage its 
credibility.349 
Some critics of such veterinary opposition go even further, arguing that veterinarians 
have engaged in professional complicity to increase the public’s perceived value of companion 
animals, actively promoting the human-animal bond,350 and they are therefore in no position to 
deny that such a bond exists when advocating against change in animals’ legal status.  Evidence 
of the veterinary profession’s recognition of the importance of the human-animal bond can be 
seen in the curricula of a number of veterinary schools (some of which have even established 
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centers on the human-animal bond), and on the amount of research studying this bond.351 
A further argument against such veterinary opposition is that its conclusion – that 
increasing animals’ status and value will lead to increased malpractice premiums that will either 
drive them out of business or make the cost of veterinary care prohibitive – is based on a faulty 
premise.  One commentator who has researched and crunched the numbers concludes that the 
effect of higher damage awards on malpractice premiums – especially if those awards are subject 
to a legislative cap – is likely to be negligible.352 Veterinarians seem to be using the 
“malpractice crisis” in human medicine as their guide.  But while there is hardly universal 
agreement that malpractice has reached crisis proportions in human medicine, there is even less 
evidence that such will be the case in veterinary medicine if the valuation or status of companion 
animals formally changes. 
Finally, returning to this author’s proposal that companion animal property become a 
recognized legal category, it is not clear that simply creating such a category will have an effect 
on veterinary malpractice separate from the societal values and legal trends that already exist.  
The recent cases that have allowed high damage awards for negligent harm to companion 
animals have not depended on any change in the animal’s legal status.  Courts have shown a 
willingness to value this type of property well above its “fair market value” by allowing recovery 
of reasonable veterinary expenses (which seems ultimately to be a benefit to the veterinary 
profession) and by looking at the animal’s actual value to owner – a valuation that does not 
depend on a status different from other property.353 
351 See supra notes 276-277. 
352 See Green, supra note 4, at 218.  In one scenario, if non-economic damages were allowed, but capped at 
$25,000, each veterinarian’s annual premiums would rise by only $212, which would translate to an annual increase 
of only thirteen cents for each pet owner.  Using the same figures, but positing a much more drastic increase in 
malpractice premiums of ten times the current amount, would only yield a fifty-two cent increase for each 
companion animal in the U.S.  See id. at 219. 
353 In other contexts, however, there have been enough court decisions where judges seem to be constrained by 
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If veterinary malpractice premiums are in fact destined to rise, the increase will be only 
partly attributable to changes in the law.  Much of any increase in malpractice may simply be due 
to the fact that animal owners are valuing their animal more and expecting more from veterinary 
care.354 And if the real concern is increased damages, then any legislative change to companion 
animals’ legal status can be accompanied by a cap on damage awards, which will go a long way 
toward alleviating any pending veterinary malpractice “crisis.”  More importantly, however, 
being driven by malpractice concerns seems to be a very short-sighted way to stake out a 
position on whether there should be a change in the legal status of animals.  Veterinarians would 
likely reap numerous other benefits from such changes in status. 
C.  Potential Benefits to The Veterinary Profession of Changing The Legal Status of 
Companion Animals 
 
The formal opposition that veterinarians and veterinary associations have raised to any 
change in the legal status of companion animals may say more about how deeply ingrained are 
their fears of litigation and the “malpractice crisis” than about how most veterinarians view their 
role with regard to the animals they treat.  If malpractice concerns were alleviated, with, for 
example, legislative caps on damages or other “tort reform” measures that have been proposed 
with regard to human medicine, it is likely that many more veterinarians would favor changing 
the legal status of companion animals.  Veterinarians, particularly the majority who treat 
companion animals, have a great deal to gain from a formal recognition that the animals they 
treat have a status that is fundamentally different from inanimate property.  Such a change would 
likely have a positive effect on the professional role of veterinarians, raising both the prestige of 
the veterinary profession and the remuneration of practitioners; it would lead to more 
 
the property label that there may be value, separate from its potential effect on malpractice awards, in changing that 
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consistency both in the way that veterinarians view themselves as professionals and with the 
realities of their practice; and it would help to eliminate many of the problems they can face 
when their professional judgment is constrained by the sometimes irrational choices of animal 
owners. 
The veterinarian’s professional role has been described as being somewhere along a 
spectrum that compares the veterinarian’s role, on one end, to that of the garage mechanic, and 
on the other end, to a pediatrician.355 This garage mechanic vs. pediatrician model has been set 
out by Bernard Rollin, a philosopher who teaches Veterinary Ethics at Colorado State Veterinary 
School.356 As Rollin explains the choices: 
If a person brings a car to a mechanic and the mechanic determines that the 
vehicle will cost five thousand dollars to repair, it is perfectly permissible for the 
owner to declare “Five thousand dollars? The hell with it! Junk it!”  On the other 
hand, if a parent brings a child to a pediatrician and the physician determines that 
the child needs five thousand dollars’ worth of surgery, the pediatrician certainly 
doesn’t allow the parent to say, “The hell with the kid! Junk ‘em! I can make 
another one.”357 
The reality of course, is that veterinarians are neither garage mechanics nor pediatricians.  Their 
professional role is somewhere in between these two extremes, and where on the spectrum it falls 
may depend on the nature of their practice.358 The point of Rollin’s analogy, however, is clear.  
As society’s view of companion animals’ status increases, and as more pet owners view their 
animals like members of the family, the more appropriate the pediatrician model seems.  But our 
current laws that view animals as simply another form of personal property are more in line with 
 
355 See ROLLIN, supra note 2, at 32. 
356 See ROLLIN, supra note 2. 
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the garage mechanic model.359 The profession stands to gain in a number of ways if 
veterinarians are treated more like pediatricians. 
Raising the legal status of companion animals to something more valued than inanimate 
property can raise the prestige of the veterinary profession in a number of ways.  Veterinary 
training is similar, in many respects, to medical training.360 In fact, there are many ways in 
which veterinarians see themselves as more skilled than physicians who practice human 
medicine: physicians, unlike veterinarians, only need to know how to treat one species, and it is 
harder to get into a veterinary school than to get into medical school.  Despite these differences, 
salaries of veterinarians lag well behind those of physicians, which fact likely has much to do 
with the legal status of the “patients” they treat.  If this status were to change, even 
incrementally, the prestige and remuneration of veterinarians would likely improve. 
A similar improvement was seen in both the social status and compensation of lab animal 
veterinarians in the wake of federal laws regulating the treatment of laboratory animals.361 When 
changes to the Animal Welfare Act were being considered that would regulate the treatment of 
lab animals through the use of institutional animal care committees and other efforts to minimize 
the pain and suffering of these animals, the proposed changes initially met with opposition from 
laboratory animal veterinary associations.362 After the Animal Welfare Act was amended, 
however, the salaries of laboratory animal veterinarians increased markedly, as did their job 
satisfaction and job security.363 They also reported that, after the law’s passage, their advice was 
 
359 See, e.g., Daughen v. Fox, supra note 45.  When animal owners cannot even recover veterinary expenses to 
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more often heeded.364 In this case, it was the legal changes that improved the status – through 
improved protections – of laboratory animals that precipitated the improvement in both the status 
and compensation of the veterinarians who treated these animals. 
Some improvements in the status and salaries of companion animal veterinarians are already 
resulting from the expansion in the way society values companion animals.  Pet owners’ 
increased willingness to spend money on their animals’ care is, not surprisingly, resulting in 
increased remuneration,365 and likely increased regard, toward veterinarians who treat 
companion animals.  Not only are these practitioners benefiting financially, the therapeutic 
options they can offer are also expanding because of the increased valuation of animals.366 And, 
despite the fact that farm animals greatly outnumber pets and companion animals,367 the vast 
majority of veterinarians practice only or mostly with companion animals.368 A change in the 
legal status of companion animals that codifies society’s increased regard for these animals can 
only continue to improve the status and salaries of companion animal veterinarians. 
Raising the legal status of companion animals to something above that of inanimate 
property would also be more consistent with way veterinarians view themselves as professionals.  
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365 See Green, supra note 4, at 209 (reporting that “[i]n the last 10 years alone, the gross revenue of companion 
animal exclusive practices has more than doubled, with 60% of this increase occurring just in the last four years.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
366 See id. at 210.  See also ROLLIN, supra note 2, at 68 (“As the moral status, and moral worth, or animals in 
society increase, there will be ever greater social pressure and expectations to treat animals – at least companion 
animals. . . . As the value of animals rises in society, so will the value of those who treat animals, and so too will the 
opportunities to actualize the scientific medicine veterinarians have evolved.”) 
367 See U.S.D.A., NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERVICE, CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 2002, at 6 tbl.1, 23 
tbl.27 & tbl.29 (2004), available at http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census02/volume1/us/USVolume104.pdf
(listing the livestock inventory in the United States in 2002 as almost 2 billion animals, consisting in part of 
95,497,994 cattle, 60,405,103 hogs and pigs, 334,435,155 layer hens, 1,389,279,047 broiler chickens, 93,028,191 
turkeys, and 6,341,799 sheep); Am. Veterinary Med. Ass’n, Veterinary Market Statistics – Companion Animals, 
2001 (2002), http://www.avma.org/membshp/marketstats/comp_exotic.asp (listing the companion animals in the 
United States in 2001 as over 147 millions animals, consisting in part of 61,572,000 dogs, 70,796,000 cats, 
10,105,000 birds, and 5,107,000 horses). 
368 See Green, supra note 4, at 211 (reporting that “over 83% of veterinarians in private practice now work 
either exclusively or predominantly with companion animals – as contrasted with the 12% who work exclusively 
with agricultural animals and the 4% who care exclusively for horses.”) 
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When Rollin has presented his pediatricians-vs.-truck mechanic model to veterinarians, he has 
found that over ninety percent lean toward the pediatrician model.369 This is perhaps not 
surprising, given that most veterinarians work in companion animal rather than agricultural 
practices.  The law’s treatment of animals as property, however, treats veterinarians, in many 
respects, more closely to the way it treats others who repair inanimate property.  
Recognizing that the status of animals should be different from other forms of property is 
also consistent with the view of the veterinary profession reflected in the code of ethics of the 
American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA).370 The code contains a number of 
references to the principle that a practitioner’s primary obligation is to her animal patients.  The 
first provision of the Professional Behavior section of the code sets out the following obligation: 
“Veterinarians should first consider the needs of the patient: to relieve disease, suffering or 
disability while minimizing pain or fear.”371 This provision, not unlike the Hippocratic oath’s 
“first, do no harm” highlights the important role that veterinarians, like doctors, play in treating 
their patients’ diseases and injuries.  And considering the needs of the patient first is certainly 
different from any kind of obligation or ethic that a professional whose work involves repairing 
inanimate property would have.  Another provision of the AVMA ethics code, regulating 
influences on judgment, sets out a similar obligation: “The choice of treatment or animal care 
should not be influenced by considerations other than the needs of the patient, the welfare of the 
client, and the safety of the public.”372 While recognizing that public safety concerns, along with 
the client-owner’s welfare (which presumably includes inability to pay for expensive treatments) 
 
369 ROLLIN, supra note 2, at 33. 
370 AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL ASS’N, AVMA CODE OF ETHICS (2003), available at 
https://vetboard.glsuite.us/Renewal/Resources/Main/Principles%20of%20Veterinary%20Medical%20Ethics%20of
%20the%20AVMA.doc .
371 AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL ASS’N, supra note 370, § II (A). 
372 Id. § V(A). 
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can influence treatment choices, this provision begins, however, by considering the “needs of the 
patient.”  The language choices alone are instructive:  the code’s use of the term “patient” 
certainly envisions a professional role that is closer to its counterpart in human medicine than to 
the mechanic who works on a car or truck. 
Elevating the legal status of animals is not only more consistent with most veterinarians’ 
view of their own professional role, it is also more consistent with the reality of today’s 
veterinary practice.  No longer primarily serving the utilitarian needs of the agricultural 
industry,373 the current face of veterinary medicine involves practices that serve primarily 
companion animals, with an increasing reliance on specialty practices.374 Dogs and cats now 
benefit from increasingly sophisticated diagnostic techniques including ultrasound, MRIs, digital 
radiography, and CT scans.375 Treatment options include surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation 
treatments for cancer, hip replacements and other complicated surgeries for orthopedic problems, 
and even dialysis and kidney transplants to treat kidney disease.376 Clearly, neither the pet 
owners who choose these sophisticated and expensive treatments, nor the veterinarians who 
practice them, are regarding the animals being treated as just another form of property.  The legal 
status of animals needs to better reflect this perception, giving it more credibility, better intuitive 
appeal, and all-around coherence. 
Academic veterinary practice recognizes the non-property status of animals in even more 
direct ways.  A number of veterinary schools now include departments or centers that focus on 
the human-animal bond.  At the University of California at Davis, for example, the Center for 
Animals in Society supports research on areas such as therapeutic and health effects of pets and 
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their role in human development,377 and includes resources such as the Program for Veterinary 
Family practice and the Pet Loss Support Hotline.378 Highlighted on the Center’s main web page 
is the declaration, “The inspiration for our activities is the rapid evolution of the relationship 
between people and animals.379 A similar program was established at the University of 
Pennsylvania’s School of Veterinary Medicine in 1997.  Penn’s Center for the Interaction of 
Animals and Society (CIAS) describes itself as a multi-disciplinary research center whose goal is 
“to   promote understanding of human-animal interactions and relationships across a wide range 
of contexts …, [by] [s]tudy[ing] the positive and negative influence of people’s relationships 
with animals on their physical and mental health and well being [and] [i]nvestigat[ing] the 
impact of these relationships on the behavior and welfare of the animals involved. . . .”380 
Clearly the development and support for such centers reflects a recognition, within the academic 
veterinary community, that the animals they treat are very different from the cars and trucks that 
mechanics repair.  Creating a legal category that recognizes this different status would bring the 
law more in line with a reality that veterinary schools have long understood. 
Veterinarians could also benefit from an improved legal status of companion animals 
because such a status could help to alleviate some of the problems they face when their treatment 
options are controlled by the sometimes irrational and harmful choices that client-owners can 
make.  When animals are viewed as property by the law, any choice of how to treat (or not to 
treat) an animal is basically the owner’s to make, even if that choice is very much against the 
animal’s interest.  Only in the rare case where the owner’s treatment choice violates an animal 
 
377 See Univeristy of California, Davis, Center for Animals in Society, Research, 
http://www.vetmed.ucdavis.edu/Animals_in_Society/Research.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2006). 
378 See Univeristy of California, Davis, Center for Animals in Society, About the Center, 
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cruelty statute381 can that choice be overridden.  And because humane euthanasia is considered a 
standard, and in fact ethical, treatment choice in veterinary medicine,382 there is ultimately little 
that a veterinarian can do when a client requests that a healthy animal be euthanized, even for the 
most trivial of reasons.383 While courts have found ways to invalidate such requests as “against 
public policy” when they come in the form of testamentary provisions,384 there is little that can 
be done under current laws to dissuade living clients from finding someone who will perform 
what has been dubbed “convenience euthanasia.”385 
Rollin reports that the request to euthanize healthy animals is the most stressful and 
demoralizing part of companion animal practice.386 Some of the real examples of convenience 
euthanasia that he cites are just horrific: “clients going on vacation and not wanting to pay 
boarding fees, or clients tired of an adult dog and wanting a puppy, or clients who have 
redecorated and the dog doesn’t match the color scheme . . . .”387 Choices such as these, awful as 
they may sound, are essentially supported by our current legal scheme that regards animals just 
like other pieces of personal property.  But while few would question the choice to get rid of a 
couch because it doesn’t match the dog, there just seems to be something wrong killing a dog 
because it doesn’t match the new couch.  One way to limit such choices is by elevating the legal 
status of companion animal so that they cannot be treated just like any other form of property. 
 
381 If, for example, a horse owner, against her veterinarian’s advice, wanted to transport a sore-footed horse to a 
different location, the veterinarian who fears that such a decision would be harmful to the horse would have little 
recourse unless the transportation would be so harmful that it would violate a provision of that state’s cruelty statute 
against transporting any animal in a cruel or inhumane manner.  See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(e) (West 
Supp. 2005). 
382 See AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL ASS’N, supra note 370, § X (“Humane euthanasia of animals is an 
ethical veterinary procedure.”) 
383 See ROLLIN, supra note 2, at 33, 59, 62-63. 
384 See supra notes168-191 and accompanying text discussing judicial decisions voiding testamentary clauses 
instructing that animals be destroyed. 
385 See ROLLIN, supra note 2, at 62. 
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A new legal category for companion animal property could respond to the need to better 
educate people who might choose to have pets when it is convenient, but who would then choose 
to euthanize them when it is not.  This goal is consistent with the educational goals of the 
“owner-to-guardian” campaign – helping pet owners to understand that they have greater 
responsibilities to their pets than to their inanimate property.388 Such understanding would be 
beneficial to the veterinary profession because it could help to reduce the stress they face when 
asked to euthanize healthy animals.389 
Another beneficial effect of this educational role might be to reduce the number of 
unwanted dogs and cats in animal shelters.  While many members of the public view their 
animals as family members, establishing strong bonds with them and taking good care of them, 
there are others whose behavior indicates that they still see companion animals as disposable 
property.390 Our current laws do little to dissuade people from this attitude.  An understanding of 
pets as “companion animal property” and the increased responsibilities that would come with 
that understanding could go far in stopping both “convenience euthanasia,” and revolving-door 
shelter adoption. 
 
388 See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
389 Although part of the opposition raised by veterinary groups to the use of guardianship language was the 
concern that owners would have less control over medical decision-making for their pets, it is unlikely that such 
decision-making would face interference unless the owner were making unreasonable choices.  If we look to 
pediatric decision-making as a model, parents’ decisions regarding their children’s medical care are rarely interfered 
with, and then only if they are putting their children in danger.  See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979): 
[P]arents generally “have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their 
children] for additional obligations.”  Surely, this includes a “high duty” to recognize symptoms of 
illness and to seek and follow medical advice.  The law’s concept of the family rests on a 
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for 
judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. 
There is no reason to expect any difference in the owner-animal relationship.  If anything, even with a legal 
status elevated above mere property, but well short of personhood, it is likely that there will continue to be much 
more deference to pet owners’ choices.  The only choice that will be interfered will be those that are simply 
unjustifiable.  And ultimately it should be a benefit to veterinarians who treat companion animals to be able to limit 
precisely these kinds of choices. 
390 These behaviors include adopting animals from shelters, only to return them at the slightest behavior 
problem, not taking adequate care of their animals, and choosing humane euthanasia for trivial reasons.  See, e.g., 
ELIZABETH HESS LOST AND FOUND: DOGS, CATS, AND EVERYDAY HEROES AT A COUNTRY ANIMAL SHELTER (2000). 
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Veterinarians thus stand to gain in a number of ways from a new legal status for 
companion animals.  And there is likely to be more support for this position if it can be 
accomplished in ways that do not implicate their concerns of increased malpractice liability or 
decreased control over their professional choices.  Carving out a new legal category such as 
“companion animal property” could alleviate many of the concerns expressed by those who 
oppose the language change from owner to guardian.  Unlike the term “guardian,” this new 
category has no established legal meaning, and it could be precisely tailored so that it achieves 
the beneficial effects that the veterinary profession would support, without the unintended 
consequences that might come with an established legal term.  In fact, some veterinary groups 
that have opposed guardianship status have, at the same time, registered their support for some 
change in the legal status of animals.  The Pennsylvania Veterinary Medical Association, for 
example, approved several position statements on March 9, 2005.391 One of these statements 
sets out their opposition to the use of the term guardian.392 But the Position Statement on Pets as 
Property, approved on the same day, sets out their support for changing the property status of 
pets: 
[W]e feel very strongly that animals are not property in the same way that tables, 
lamps or cars are property. 
. . .
We further believe that an appropriate definition of a pet must be 
developed prior to any changes or expansions in the laws on damages for pet loss.  
In our search of PA law and the laws of other states, we have been unable to find 
an adequate definition for a “pet” or “companion animal” that would allow us to 
reach a consensus on the subject of pets as property.  PVMA is developing a 
definition and welcomes comments from all interested parties.393 
391 See Pennsylvania Veterinary Medical Ass’n, Position Statements (Mar. 9, 2005), available at 
http://www.pavma.org/Images/05_Apr_Position_Stmnts.pdf.
392 See id.
393 Id.
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This forward-looking group realizes that the profession, the animals they treat, and the owners 
who care for those animals all have much to gain from developing a new legal definition that 
better captures the way that we as a society value our companion animals. 
Conclusion
Although the law has traditionally treated all animals as property, there are an increasing 
number of areas where the legal system is beginning to recognize that companion animals are 
fundamentally different from other forms of property.  These changes in the law are just 
beginning to catch up with the way in which our society values companion animals.  We should 
formally recognize these changes by creating a new legal category for companion animals that 
better reflects their status as somewhere between property and persons.  Creating this new 
category will help lead toward more consistent treatment of animals across various areas of law, 
and treatment by the legal system that will better reflect the way in which we value our animals.  
While the veterinary community has in the past opposed any change to the legal status of 
animals, professional veterinary groups are now beginning to realize that such a change is not 
only inevitable, but also desirable.  Veterinary groups will benefit by the creation of such a new 
legal category and by helping to shape its parameters.  It is in the profession’s best interests to 
support and develop changes in the legal status of companion animals because these changes will 
have a positive effect on the professional role of veterinarians, will lead to more consistency with 
the realities of their practices, and will give them better opportunities to exercise their 
professional judgment. 
